Huggins, R v

A superior court may commit for contempt in the face of the court only where the contempt is clearly proved and immediate committal is necessary to protect the justice process and its participants. Imprisonment is a last resort. The judge must allow time for reflection, consider whether it should extend overnight, and ask whether a lesser step will provide adequate protection. Conduct may constitute contempt after the trial has ended; proof of an intention to disrupt proceedings is unnecessary. A prompt, genuine apology and an emotional outburst may mean that no committal is required, even though contempt is proved.

The appellant, aged 19, shouted and gestured towards the jury after his mother was convicted and sentenced for importing cocaine at Croydon Crown Court. He left the courtroom, was detained, apologised through counsel, and explained that he had been overwhelmed by learning of the trial and sentence.

The judge found contempt in the face of the court and, after a ten-minute adjournment, imposed 28 days’ imprisonment. On 22 June 2006 the Court of Appeal reduced the term to seven days to secure the appellant’s release, while reserving the validity of the finding. The present appeal, brought as of right under the Administration of Justice Act 1960, concerned whether conduct after a completed trial was contempt and whether immediate committal was justified.

1. Appeal allowed. The court quashed the order committing the appellant to prison. It upheld the finding that he had committed contempt in the face of the court.
2. The Crown Court, as a superior court of record, had summary jurisdiction to protect the criminal justice process and those participating in it, particularly jurors. That jurisdiction exists to secure protection, not to punish precipitately. It may be exercised only where contempt is clearly proved and immediate action is necessary because no lesser course will protect the ends of justice.
3. Contempt may be committed after the trial has ended. There is no requirement to prove that the alleged contemnor intended to disrupt proceedings. The appellant’s threatening manner and gesture towards the jury were sufficient, despite the absence of abusive or expressly threatening words and despite the conclusion of the trial.
4. However, a finding of contempt does not make immediate imprisonment necessary. Following Moran, 81 Cr App R 51, a judge must not decide committal too quickly. The judge must reflect on the appropriate course, including whether reflection should extend overnight, and must consider lesser measures. The court could detain a contemnor while it considered that course, as recognised in R v Hill, [1986] Crim LR 457.
5. The judge had allowed the appellant legal representation but acted after only ten minutes. Given the brief emotional outburst, the completed trial, the appellant’s immediate full apology, and the available alternative of an overnight adjournment while he remained in custody, committal was procedurally and substantively wrong. The proper order was therefore to quash it.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — in [2007] EWCA Crim 732, allowed the appeal and quashed the order for committal, while maintaining that the appellant’s conduct amounted to contempt.
• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), 22 June 2006 — reduced the 28-day term to seven days to secure the appellant’s immediate release, without determining the validity of the contempt finding.
• Croydon Crown Court, 13 June 2006 — found the appellant in contempt in the face of the court and committed him to prison for 28 days.