HM Solicitor General v Trudi Ann Warner

At the permission stage of common-law contempt proceedings, the claimant must show a reasonable basis for committal and that pursuing the proceedings is in the public interest. Conduct is not an interference with the administration of justice merely because it communicates information to jurors. A passive placard accurately stating jury equity did not amount to serious threatening, intimidatory, abusive or harassing conduct. The court also indicated that prosecution would be disproportionate under Article 10 where an adequate judicial direction could address any risk of prejudice.

The Solicitor General sought permission under Rule 81.3 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 to bring common-law contempt proceedings against Trudi Ann Warner. Before the first day of an Insulate Britain-related criminal trial, Ms Warner stood outside the judges’ entrance to the Inner London Crown Court holding a placard stating that jurors had an absolute right to acquit according to conscience.

The conduct was captured on CCTV and was not materially disputed. The issues were whether it disclosed a reasonable basis for committal, including serious interference with the administration of justice, and whether pursuing proceedings would be in the public interest consistently with Article 10 ECHR.

1. Permission refused; claim dismissed. The conduct did not disclose a reasonable basis for committal.
2. The contempt category protecting court participants travelling to and from court did not apply. Ms Warner did not assault, threaten, block, accost or impede anyone. The relevant principle concerns threatening, intimidatory, abusive or harassing conduct, whether physical or verbal. The court distinguished the materially more aggressive conduct in Attorney General v Yaxley-Lennon [2019] EWHC 1791 and explained the limited significance of R v Runting (1989) 89 Cr App R 243.
3. The placard was informative rather than an instruction, encouragement or invitation to jurors to act in a particular way. Jury equity is an established constitutional principle, although jurors remain under a duty to follow the judge’s legal directions and their oath or affirmation. Communicating the bare principle accurately in a public forum was not unlawful.
4. The conduct did not arguably constitute embracery. R v Owen [1976] 1 WLR 840 did not establish that embracery and common-law contempt are coterminous. Embracery had in any event been abolished by section 17 of the Bribery Act 2010.
5. The claimant failed to show a serious actual or risked interference with the administration of justice. Any risk arising from jurors seeing the placard was adequately addressed by the trial judge’s short direction.
6. Although unnecessary to the result, the court held that contempt proceedings would not have been a proportionate interference with Article 10 rights. The proceedings pursued a legitimate aim, but a criminal prosecution was unnecessary where the judicial direction sufficiently protected the trial process.