Rosemary Webster & Ors v The King

The jury’s constitutional freedom lies in deciding guilt or innocence and cannot be removed by a judicial direction to convict. A judge must direct the jury on the law and leave the verdict to them, although the judge may express a strong view on the evidence as advice. The freedom to acquit does not authorise jurors to engage during the trial in conduct showing an intention to decide otherwise than on the evidence. Section 20C of the Juries Act 1974 criminalises such conduct, but not the mere return of a verdict of not guilty. Directions warning jurors about prohibited conduct and outside attempts to influence them will not make convictions unsafe unless, viewed in the context of the whole trial and summing-up, they create a real risk that jurors believed acquittal would attract punishment.

Five appellants were convicted at Inner London Crown Court of destroying property, contrary to Criminal Damage Act 1971, s 1(1). They admitted damaging windows and panels belonging to JP Morgan Chase Bank, but relied on the lawful-excuse defence in s 5(2)(a), asserting an honest belief that shareholders would have consented to the damage if aware of it and its circumstances.

The third, fourth and fifth appellants appealed by leave. The first sought an extension of time and permission to vary her notice, and the second renewed her application for leave. All relied on a common challenge to directions concerning posters and placards telling jurors that they could acquit according to conscience, and to the judge’s references to criminal offences and imprisonment. The central issue was whether those directions were legally wrong or rendered the convictions unsafe.

1. Appeals dismissed. The court granted the first appellant an extension of time and permission to vary her notice, and granted both the first and second appellants leave to advance the common ground. The third, fourth and fifth appellants’ appeals proceeded by leave. The convictions were safe.
2. A jury may not be directed to convict in a criminal case. The judge must direct the jury on the law and leave the verdict to them, although a judge may express a strong view that the evidence supports conviction, provided it is advice rather than direction. The jury’s immunity from sanction for its verdict, established in Bushell’s Case (1670) 124 ER 1006, protects the decision as to what verdict to return.
3. The court declined to treat Warner, [2024] EWHC 918 (KB), as a sound guide. It was not binding, had not considered s 20C, and its approach to a supposed right to acquit according to conscience left unresolved the tension with the juror’s oath and mandatory judicial directions.
4. The freedom to return a perverse verdict means a jury may acquit even where the application of law to undisputed facts would warrant conviction. It does not extend to a perverse guilty verdict, because the judge may direct an acquittal under R v Galbraith, (1981) 73 Cr App R 124. The distinction is protection of the accused, not a general licence to disregard the evidence.
5. The judge’s paraphrase of s 20C was substantially accurate. The offence concerns conduct during the trial from which it may reasonably be concluded that the juror intends to try the issue otherwise than on the evidence. It does not criminalise returning a not-guilty verdict. Encouraging a juror to engage in that prohibited conduct may attract secondary liability. The judge’s broader comments that the posters misstated the law and that the placard-holders were committing an offence were more questionable, but addressed a live risk of jurors being drawn into prohibited conduct.
6. The references to arrest and imprisonment did not threaten the jury. The summing-up repeatedly made clear that the verdict was theirs alone and that they must decide on the evidence. In context, the comments were intended to address outside influence and reassure jurors about protection from interference. The jury’s note about whether consent had to exist at the time of damage also indicated that at least one juror was properly addressing the evidence.
7. The appellants’ convictions followed overwhelming evidence and a fair trial. The directions, considered cumulatively and in context, did not create a real risk that the jury believed acquittal would lead to imprisonment.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): [2026] EWCA Crim 9. Appeals dismissed. The first appellant received an extension of time and permission to vary her notice; the first and second appellants were granted leave to appeal on the common ground. The third, fourth and fifth appellants’ convictions from Inner London Crown Court were upheld.
• Inner London Crown Court: The appellants were convicted following a jury trial before His Honour Judge Reid. The judgment under appeal is not separately cited.