Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions (R v)

Section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1911 protects prohibited places against sabotage as well as spying. A person who deliberately seeks to obstruct the operational use of a defence airfield has a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State. A remote political objective, however sincere or benevolent, does not alter that direct purpose.

In this context, the interests of the State are those arising from the State’s existing defence policies and dispositions. A criminal court is not the forum for deciding whether those policies, including nuclear armament, would be wiser if changed. Evidence directed only to that political question is therefore inadmissible.

Six appellants, members or supporters of the Committee of 100, were convicted and imprisoned for conspiracy to enter, and to incite others to enter, the Royal Air Force station at Wethersfield contrary to section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1911. Their planned demonstration was intended temporarily to immobilise aircraft operating from the base as part of a campaign for nuclear disarmament.

At trial, Havers J excluded evidence and argument that nuclear weapons were contrary to the country’s true interests and that the appellants honestly believed disarmament beneficial. The Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed their appeals, certified a point of general public importance, and granted leave to appeal.

The central issue was the meaning of a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State under section 1, and whether the appellants could challenge defence policy before the jury.

1. The appeals were dismissed unanimously. Lords Reid, Radcliffe, Hodson and Pearce agreed that the convictions were properly obtained. Lord Devlin also concluded that the appellants had committed the offence, although he expressed a different analysis of some jury and constitutional issues.

2. Per Lord Reid, section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1911 was not confined by its side note to spying. Read with section 3, it plainly extended to sabotage of a prohibited place. The appellants intended and desired to immobilise the airfield, knowing that this would, or might, substantially impair its operational effectiveness. That was a relevant purpose even though they also sought to influence public opinion.

3. Lord Radcliffe treated the intended obstruction as the appellants’ direct purpose and their campaign for nuclear disarmament as their motive or indirect objective. The latter could not qualify the former. He distinguished a case in which obstruction is merely the means of preventing an immediate disaster, such as stopping an aircraft because of a time bomb.

4. The majority held that the disposition and armament of the forces are matters of State policy which a court cannot reassess under section 1. The interests of the State in this setting are its interests under the policies adopted by its recognised organs of government, rather than interests which a jury considers the State ought to have. Evidence about the merits of nuclear disarmament was therefore irrelevant and properly excluded. It remained open to a defendant to show that the proposed acts would not impair the operational effectiveness of the prohibited place.

5. Lord Devlin agreed that the appeal failed. He considered that purpose was subjective in the sense that it exists in the actor’s mind, but that the question whether a selected purpose was prejudicial was objectively answered. In his view, the jury retained responsibility for statutory facts and the Crown’s opinion could not replace proof. On the facts, however, immobilising a Crown defence airfield was prejudicial to the State’s existing interests, and the excluded political evidence could not assist the defence.

• House of Lords: appeals dismissed: [1964] AC 763.

• Court of Criminal Appeal: dismissed the appellants’ appeals, certified a point of law of general public importance, and granted leave to appeal to the House of Lords.

• Trial before Havers J: the appellants were convicted on 20 February 1962 of conspiracy to commit and to incite breaches of section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1911.