Santiago v R

A court’s summary contempt jurisdiction is not confined to conduct requiring immediate punishment to preserve a trial in progress. Urgency is relevant to whether the summary process should be used rather than a more measured procedure. A judge may defer both liability and punishment where fairness requires it, and the end of the trial does not prevent later summary action.

Deliberately disrupting court proceedings by force or abuse towards dock staff, or refusing to obey a lawful order to attend for sentence, may directly interfere with the administration of justice and amount to contempt. Article 6 requires a fair and impartial process, but does not impose a higher standard than domestic law where the fair-minded and informed observer would find no real possibility of bias.

The appellant appealed two findings of contempt made by the trial judge at the Crown Court sitting at St Albans on 16 May 2003.

The first finding arose after the appellant pushed and struggled with a dock officer, swore at him and was removed from court. The second arose when he refused to comply with an order to attend court for sentencing and abused the court clerk. The appellant contended that the judge should not have dealt with either matter summarily after the trial had ended, and that the procedure breached Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

A separate appeal concerning the conspiracy conviction and sentence had been determined on 19 January 2005: [2005] EWCA Crim 91.

1. The appeals against the findings of contempt were dismissed. The judge was entitled to deal with the first incident as contempt. The undisputed evidence established that the appellant deliberately used force and abuse towards a dock officer after being properly required to take his place. Such conduct directly interfered with the orderly administration of justice.

2. The court distinguished between the existence of summary contempt jurisdiction and the good practice governing its exercise. Balogh v St Albans Crown Court did not make immediate action a condition of jurisdiction. As clarified by Wilkinson v S and another, a serious contempt may properly be dealt with summarily after an immediate hearing or trial has ended. A judge may defer the question of contempt and punishment. Indeed, immediate action should be avoided where it would deny the alleged contemnor a fair opportunity to answer the allegation.

3. On these facts, referral for a possible prosecution in the Magistrates’ Court would have been disproportionate. The judge had announced at the time that the conduct might be treated as contempt, the facts were not disputed, and summary proceedings could maintain the authority and order of the court.

4. Article 6 did not invalidate the procedure. The domestic requirements of fairness and impartiality met the Convention standard. Applying the fair-minded and informed observer test, there was no real possibility of bias: the essential facts were undisputed, and the Court of Appeal could review both the findings and any punishment.

5. The appellant’s refusal to attend for sentence also amounted to contempt. A defendant who is available and lawfully ordered to attend does not have a free choice whether to do so. Sentencing is an integral and public part of the criminal process, and deliberate disobedience interferes with the due administration of justice.

6. The court nevertheless expressed doubt, as a matter of practice, whether the contempt power should be exercised for a refusal to attend sentence. In the separate sentencing appeal, the one-month term imposed for that contempt was made concurrent rather than consecutive.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): dismissed the appellant’s appeals against the two contempt findings in [2005] EWCA Crim 556.
• Crown Court sitting at St Albans: His Honour Judge Findlay Baker QC found the appellant guilty of two contempts of court on 16 May 2003.