Lee Feldman & Anor v Gambling Commission

A reporting restriction order under section 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 is an exceptional derogation from open justice. It may be made only where reporting would create a substantial risk of prejudice to the administration of justice, the order would remove that risk, and no less restrictive measure would suffice. The court must then balance the competing public interests, including open justice and freedom of expression, against the fair administration of justice. A restriction should be limited to the material necessary to avoid the risk. The fact that proceedings were brought voluntarily, or that related matters have already been reported, does not determine the application.

The claimants’ substantive claims had been dismissed in an earlier judgment delivered on 19 January 2026. They sought permission to appeal and applied under section 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 for postponement of reporting of findings in that judgment. The application arose against the background of pending criminal proceedings against the claimants and others, in which a trial was scheduled for 2028.

The defendant and the Crown Prosecution Service opposed a restriction covering the judgment as a whole. The central questions were whether publication created a substantial risk of prejudice to the criminal proceedings and, if so, what restriction was necessary and proportionate.

1. Permission to appeal. Applying CPR 52.6(1), the court refused permission to appeal. The proposed grounds did not have a real prospect of success and no other compelling reason for an appeal was established.
2. Open justice. Fair, accurate, full and contemporaneous reporting of judgments is the default. A reporting restriction order is exceptional, requires clear justification and must be strictly necessary to secure the proper administration of justice. The relevant prejudice concerns public policy and the administration of justice, rather than the private interests or reputational vindication of the parties.
3. Three-stage approach. Following the staged approach in Ex p The Telegraph Group plc [2001] EWCA Crim 1075, the court must ask: whether reporting creates a substantial risk of prejudice; whether a section 4(2) order would eliminate that risk and whether less restrictive means would suffice; and whether the risk should nevertheless be tolerated as the lesser of two evils. “Substantial” means more than insubstantial or minimal.
4. The evidence of media interest, together with the connection between the findings and an issue for determination by the future jury, established a real and substantial risk. The passage of time and judicial directions could not justify assuming that the effect of reporting would necessarily fade.
5. The balance did not justify postponing the judgment in its entirety. Much of the reasoning stood independently of the protected findings, and there was a strong public interest in publication of findings favourable to the defendant. A restriction limited to the identified findings was sufficient and proportionate.
6. The claimants’ application was therefore granted in part. Reporting of the identified findings was postponed until the return of the last verdict in the criminal proceedings, or further order. An open version of the judgment was to be published with those findings removed, alongside material already restricted by Hill J’s order.

The judgment records that the claimants’ substantive claims had been dismissed by the court’s judgment handed down on 19 January 2026. The present judgment determined the consequential applications for permission to appeal and for a reporting restriction order.