MSB, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Under ss 95–96 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, accommodation is adequate if it meets the statutory minimum required to prevent destitution: a dignified standard of living adequate for health and capable of ensuring subsistence. The duty is not to provide the most beneficial or locally preferred arrangement.

The prohibition on considering a location preference does not prevent the Secretary of State from considering medical, educational or other personal circumstances when deciding what accommodation will meet an individual’s needs. Relocation-related disruption will generally be insufficient unless its severity is comparable to deprivation of essential living needs. A strict allocation policy is lawful if special needs are considered and alternative accommodation is rationally found adequate.

The claimants were two adults and three children supported under ss 95–96 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. Their two-bedroom flat in Oxford had become too small. The Secretary of State offered larger self-contained accommodation elsewhere, which the family declined because of the educational, therapeutic and mental-health consequences of leaving Oxford.

The claimants brought a rolled-up judicial review concerning statutory adequacy, adherence to dispersal policies, the child-welfare duty under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, and Article 8. Cutts J had ordered an expedited hearing. The central issue was whether accommodation outside Oxford could lawfully be regarded as adequate for the family’s needs.

1. Disposition. Permission to apply for judicial review was granted on Ground 1A but refused on Grounds 1B, 2 and 3. The judicial review claim was dismissed.
2. Statutory adequacy. The court applied the principled approach in R (SA) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWHC 1787 (Admin). Adequacy under the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 is assessed against the needs of each person in the destitution-prevention context and requires an objective minimum standard of dignified living adequate for health and capable of ensuring subsistence. It does not require accommodation that is optimal or maximally beneficial.
3. Location and personal circumstances. The restriction on considering a locality preference is absolute, but sections 95(6)(d) and 97(2)(a) do not prevent the Secretary of State from considering medical, educational or other personal circumstances when deciding what accommodation is adequate. The court applied the approach stated in R (SH) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWHC 729 (Admin). The Secretary of State must also take vulnerable persons’ special needs into account under regulation 4 of the Asylum Seekers (Reception Conditions) Regulations 2005.
4. Application to the family. Moving outside Oxford could cause significant short-term detriment to the child’s education and to both adults’ access to existing therapy. That detriment did not approach deprivation of essential living needs or of a dignified standard of living adequate for health and subsistence. Accommodation outside Oxford was therefore capable of being adequate.
5. Policies. The court recognised the policy principle stated in Mandalia v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] 1 WLR 4546 and R (Lee-Hirons) v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] UKSC 46. The healthcare policy’s instruction to avoid adverse effects wherever possible was conditional and did not guarantee continued access to open-ended charitable therapy in the same locality. The requests had been considered sufficiently and permission on Ground 1B was refused; alternatively, the ground would have been dismissed.
6. Child welfare and human rights. Section 55 imposed a process duty requiring the child’s welfare to be treated as a primary consideration, not as paramount. The court applied the principles discussed in R (DXK) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWHC 579 (Admin) and R (Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 193. The child’s welfare had been considered. An offer of adequate accommodation outside Oxford was not an Article 8 interference and did not require a different result.

High Court (Administrative Court): Cutts J ordered an expedited rolled-up hearing on 15 June 2026. At that hearing, permission was granted on Ground 1A and refused on Grounds 1B, 2 and 3; the judicial review claim was dismissed.