SH, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Hotel rooms supplied as initial asylum accommodation are not “dwellings” for Part X of the Housing Act 1985 where they are provided on a temporary, night-by-night licence without a fixed right of occupation. Their prolonged use does not alter that conclusion, although duration remains relevant to whether accommodation is “adequate” under the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999.

Adequacy depends on the individual needs and vulnerabilities of each supported person and dependant, including health, children’s welfare and the cumulative effect of conditions and duration. The Secretary of State must identify those needs, engage rationally with important evidence and ensure that the accommodation provided meets them. The prohibition on considering locational preferences does not prevent consideration of location-specific needs.

Two adult asylum seekers, SH and BWO, brought judicial review claims concerning prolonged accommodation in hotel rooms provided under sections 95–96 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. SH remained in a single hotel room with her husband and two children for more than three years. BWO and her two sons occupied one hotel room for three years before dispersal accommodation was provided.

The claims challenged the application of statutory overcrowding provisions, the lawfulness of Home Office accommodation guidance, whether SH’s hotel was an unlicensed house in multiple occupation, and whether the accommodation was adequate. BWO’s claim was continued after she moved to dispersal accommodation because the legal issues remained material to her damages claim.

1. Part X of the Housing Act 1985. A hotel room can in principle be a separate dwelling, and lack of cooking facilities is not decisive. Applying the analysis in R (N) v Lewisham LBC, however, a hotel room supplied as initial asylum accommodation under section 95 was not being used as a dwelling. The accommodation was inherently temporary, provided on a night-by-night basis, conferred no fixed or minimum right of occupation, and was supplied within a statutory scheme designed to address destitution. Prolonged occupation did not change that conclusion.
2. Guidance. Part X did not directly govern the hotel rooms. The Space Standards Paper therefore imposed extra-statutory standards. Its adapted use of Part X concepts, including some account of communal facilities, was not irrational. The duty of prescription identified in R (ZLL) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government did not require a precise, legally determinative methodology in this context.
3. House in multiple occupation. The court declined to decide conclusively whether the Finchley Hotel was an HMO requiring a licence. That issue could be investigated by the local housing authority, and a concluded finding might unfairly prejudice persons not represented in the proceedings.
4. Adequacy. Under sections 95–96, the Secretary of State had to identify the relevant individual and family needs and rationally provide accommodation meeting them. The assessment required attention to vulnerabilities, children’s welfare, health, the totality and duration of conditions, and the difference between preferences and needs. A locational preference could not be considered under section 97(2), but location-specific medical or other needs could be considered.
5. SH’s accommodation was inadequate from 16 December 2023 to the end of April 2025, when the family had lived for a year in one room with a newborn and an older child. The Secretary of State’s later decision refusing London-area accommodation was unlawful because it failed properly to engage with the psychiatric evidence and applied an erroneous “strong exceptional circumstances” test.
6. BWO’s accommodation became inadequate on 1 October 2022 because she had to share a bed with one of her sexually mature sons, compounded by her trafficking-related vulnerability and mobility problems. The Secretary of State was also in breach from 8 January to 3 July 2025 by failing to provide London accommodation after learning of BWO’s imminent knee surgery.
7. The judicial review claims succeeded only to those limited extents. No order requiring particular accommodation for SH was made, because a lawful decision might still conclude that accommodation outside London would meet her identified needs.

These were first-instance judicial review claims heard together. Permission was granted in SH’s claim in July 2025. In BWO’s claim, a rolled-up hearing was ordered in August 2025. The claims succeeded only to the limited findings of breach identified by the court.