R v P (Appeal: Dismissal of Private Law Proceedings at Directions Hearing)

On appeal in private-law children proceedings, first-instance welfare decisions attract a generous margin of discretion. The appellate court may intervene where the decision is wrong or unjust because of a serious procedural irregularity, including failure to consider material information affecting the child’s welfare.

A family court may make a final, non-consensual order at a directions hearing and may assess disputed information when deciding whether a full investigation is necessary and proportionate. That power does not justify summary disposal where the evidential picture is complex, the proposed outcome is significant, or further contact may benefit the child. The child’s welfare remains paramount under Children Act 1989; serious domestic abuse does not automatically exclude all direct contact. Uncommissioned clinical evidence may be considered, but its source and reliance on self-report affect weight.

The father appealed from an order made by HHJ Williscroft in the Family Court at Derby after a five-day fact-finding hearing. The judge found that he had perpetrated domestic abuse, but also found that he had genuine reasons for seeking a relationship with the child. At a one-hour directions hearing, she ended the application for direct contact, ordered limited indirect contact and made a 24-month restriction under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989.

The appeal challenged the summary procedure, the absence of a further Cafcass report or children’s guardian, the treatment of clinical evidence concerning the mother’s health, and the restriction on further applications. The central issue was whether the proceedings could properly be brought to an end without further investigation, particularly when the mother’s continuing judicial review litigation had not been drawn to the lower court’s attention.

Disposition. The appeal was allowed. The order of HHJ Williscroft was set aside and the matter was remitted for reconsideration before Harris J. A children’s guardian was appointed. The question of a restriction under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989 was left for fresh determination.

1. The court applied rule 30.12(3) of the Family Procedure Rules 2010. The generous ambit accorded to first-instance judges in children cases required appellate restraint, but did not prevent intervention where the discretion had been exercised on an improper basis or the decision could not fairly stand. The principles in G v G [1985] UKHL 13 and Piglowska v Piglowski [1999] 1 WLR 1360 were applied.
2. The court accepted that a family court may make a final, non-consensual order at a directions hearing. It may consider disputed information when deciding whether a further investigation is necessary and proportionate. The guidance in Re A, B and C (Child Arrangements: Final Order At Dispute Resolution Appointment) [2025] EWCA Civ 55 and Re C (Children) (Residence Order: Application being dismissed at the Fact Finding Stage) [2012] EWCA Civ 1489 did not make summary disposal appropriate in every case.
3. The judge was entitled in principle to proceed without a further section 7 report where the child’s perspective had already been explored and further inquiry was unlikely to add meaningful information. She was also entitled to consider evidence from the mother’s treating clinicians. However, the absence of instruction under Part 25 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010, the reliance on self-report and the earlier findings about the mother’s reliability were relevant to the weight of that evidence. The appellate judge also expressed an obiter reservation about treating a post-fact-finding statement as proof of genuine acceptance of adverse findings.
4. The mother’s continuing and vigorous judicial review litigation was highly relevant to the welfare assessment. It was inconsistent with the asserted need for an immediate end to proceedings and reinforced the concern that she intended to remove the father from the child’s life. That information had not been disclosed before the lower court gave judgment. The judge had therefore been prevented from exercising her discretion on a proper basis.
5. The serious findings of domestic abuse were not minimised. They did not, without further assessment, justify writing off every possibility of direct contact, particularly where indirect contact had proved ineffective and the child’s long-term interest in a relationship with her father remained material. The potential benefit of contact had to be balanced against the physical and emotional safety of the child and the harm to her primary caregiver.

• High Court (Family Division) — On appeal, the court allowed the appeal, set aside the order and remitted the matter for reconsideration before Harris J, with a children’s guardian appointed: [2026] EWHC 2215 (Fam) .
• Family Court at Derby — HHJ Williscroft ended the father’s application for contact at a one-hour directions hearing, ordered limited indirect contact and made a restriction under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989.