Graham Phillips, R (on the application of) v The London Borough of Islington

[2026] EWHC 2243 (Admin)

Summary

At the permission stage of judicial review, a claimant must show an arguable ground with a realistic prospect of success. Where Convention rights are relied on, the court may assess that prospect by applying the substantive proportionality criteria, including objective importance, rational connection, less intrusive means and fair balance. A billing authority’s discretion under the Local Government Finance Act 1992, s 13A(1)(c), is broad. Although s 13A does not expressly address stays, the authority may decline to continue one because a taxpayer is sanctioned, while considering local service funding and residents’ interests. A lawful asset freeze does not, without more, make collection unlawful, particularly where a licence permits tax payment. The Class D(1)(a) exemption under the Council Tax (Exempt Dwellings) Order 1992 did not apply.

Factual background

The claimant sought renewed permission for judicial review of Islington’s refusal to reduce or exempt his council-tax liability and its decision to end a stay on enforcement. He argued that designation under the sanctions regime had left him unable to pay, making enforcement disproportionate under Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights and irrational under the Local Government Finance Act 1992. An earlier challenge to the designation was dismissed by Johnson J ([2024] 1 WLR 2227), and permission to appeal was refused. DHCJ Pittaway KC refused permission on paper; the present court considered the renewed application. The central issues were whether the claim was in time, whether the statutory exemption or s 13A discretion was engaged, and whether either ground had a realistic prospect of success.

Held

Permission refused. The claim was brought in time. The court left the alternative-remedy issue undecided because it had not heard submissions on whether s 16 of the Local Government Finance Act 1992 applies to enforcement decisions. That did not affect the result because neither ground had a realistic prospect of success.

  1. Permission and proportionality. Applying Sharma v Browne Antoine [2006] UKPC 57, the court treated the permission question as whether an arguable ground had a realistic prospect of success. Applying the approach described in Shvidler v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs [2025] UKSC 30, it made its own assessment by reference to the four-stage proportionality inquiry: important objective, rational connection, less intrusive means and fair balance.
  2. Statutory position. Section 13A(1)(c) of the Local Government Finance Act 1992 conferred a very broad discretion to reduce council tax. The authority could consider the claimant’s circumstances, residents’ interests and the funding of local services. The provision did not expressly address staying enforcement, and a sanctioned status did not require a reduction or continuing stay. The Class D(1)(a) exemption did not apply because the claimant was not detained in prison pursuant to an order of a United Kingdom court.
  3. Application. Council-tax collection pursued a legitimate objective and was rationally connected to it. No less intrusive measure was identified, particularly given the period allowed for payment, the absence of an application for welfare support and the temporary nature of any s 13A relief. The prior finding that designation and the asset freeze were lawful and proportionate meant that enforcement was not rendered unlawful merely because the freeze impaired payment. The OFSI licence permitted payment and could be varied.

Other orders. The court declined broad anonymity and file-access restrictions, but made a limited order for notice of non-party access applications and production of redacted statements under the Civil Procedure Rules 1998. It confirmed the £2,925 costs order and otherwise made no order as to costs.

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Appellate history

DHCJ Pittaway KC refused permission on paper on 14 May 2026. The claimant renewed the application; the present court heard it on 23 July 2026 and refused permission.

Key cases cited

2 authorities cited.

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