Remi William Akinyemi, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

For registration under the British Nationality Act 1981, section 41A imposes the same mandatory good-character requirement on applications under section 1(4) as on other covered routes. The statutory entitlement does not reverse the burden of proof or require a more lenient test. The assessment must be individualised and holistic, but guidance may state that serious offending will normally lead to refusal if read as a whole and allowing exceptions. Under section 4L, the words but for require proof, on the balance of probabilities, of what would have happened absent an exceptional circumstance. They do not establish a loss-of-chance test. A direct causation threshold is unlawful, but the error is immaterial where the outcome would probably have been the same. Article 8 does not generally confer a right to acquire a particular nationality.

The claimant was born in the United Kingdom in 1983 and had lived there throughout his life. He applied to be registered as a British citizen under sections 1(4) and 4L of the British Nationality Act 1981. The Secretary of State refused the application, relying principally on the good-character requirement and the absence of exceptional circumstances causally preventing earlier registration. The claimant had an extensive criminal record, but had not offended since 2018.

Permission was granted to challenge the decision, the good-character guidance, the adequacy of the reasons, the interpretation of section 4L, and compatibility with Article 8. The central issues were whether section 1(4) required a distinctive and more favourable good-character approach, whether section 4L involved a direct or loss-of-chance test, and whether refusal unlawfully interfered with the claimant’s Convention rights.

1. Disposition. The judicial review claim was dismissed. None of the claimant’s grounds was made out.
2. Good character. The word entitlement in section 1(4) of the British Nationality Act 1981 describes a statutory route subject to conditions. It does not create a fundamental, common-law or constitutional right. The Supreme Court’s reasoning in R (O) and R (Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens (PRCBC)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] AC 255, and the approach in R (Williams) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWHC 1268 (Admin), supported that conclusion. Section 41A is a single mandatory requirement. The applicant bears the burden of satisfying the Secretary of State as to good character. A high standard may be adopted, subject to lawful and individualised decision-making. The evidence showed that the Secretary of State considered positive and negative aspects, mitigation, rehabilitation, the circumstances of the offending and the sentencing history.
3. Guidance and reasons. Applying R (A) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] UKSC 37, the good-character guidance had to be read as a whole. Its statement that serious offending or a significant custodial sentence would normally lead to refusal was lawful because the guidance also required consideration of relevant factors, mitigation and countervailing evidence. The reasoning duty was satisfied. The decision letter addressed the principal controversial issues and removed genuine doubt about the decision, without needing to analyse every item of evidence. The approach was consistent with Oakley v South Cambridgeshire District Council [2017] EWCA Civ 71, AHK v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 287 and the authorities concerning adequacy of reasons.
4. Section 4L. The statutory test is a simple but-for counterfactual. It requires proof of what would have happened before the section 4L application, not merely a real and substantial chance. The court applied R (APD) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWHC 246 (Admin) on that point. Section 4L contains no additional requirement that the qualifying circumstance operate directly. The repeated use of directly in the reconsideration decision imposed an unlawful strict remoteness threshold. However, the claimant had not provided cogent evidence that his parents would have applied or informed him so that registration would have occurred. It was highly likely that the outcome would have been the same without the error.
5. Article 8. The good-character provisions were not arbitrary. Article 8 does not guarantee a particular nationality, although arbitrary, discriminatory or sufficiently severe consequences may engage it. The authorities relied on were factually distinguishable. Refusal of registration did not remove the claimant from the United Kingdom, and the evidence did not establish an unlawful interference with private or family life.