Baron Ranger (Raminder Singh Ranger), R (on the application of) v The Prime Minister

The exercise of a prerogative power is not automatically immune from judicial review. Justiciability depends on the subject matter, the court’s constitutional competence and whether the decision engages a reviewable public-law issue. A decision to recommend revocation of an honour is reviewable in principle where a published procedure and criteria govern the process, the decision is not a personal or political act of the Sovereign, and revocation has serious consequences for the recipient. The absence of a right to receive an honour does not resolve whether a recipient has a procedural legitimate expectation in a published forfeiture process. The court decided only justiciability; the merits and any particular grounds of challenge remained open.

The Claimant held a CBE granted by Queen Elizabeth II. Following a recommendation by the Honours Forfeiture Committee, the Prime Minister advised HM The King to revoke it. The Claimant sought judicial review of the Prime Minister’s recommendation, not the King’s formal decision.

The parties agreed that justiciability should be decided as a preliminary issue. The court considered whether a recommendation to revoke an honour was reviewable at common law and whether the Human Rights Act 1998 claim was justiciable. The underlying allegations, the merits of the forfeiture decision and the specific grounds of challenge were not before the court.

1. Common-law justiciability. The court rejected the proposition that prerogative decisions form a single class immune from review. The analysis depends on the subject matter and the court’s constitutional competence. Shergill v Khaira [2014] UKSC 33 identifies issues beyond the courts’ constitutional competence and issues lacking private rights or reviewable public-law matters; an issue in the latter category may still be resolved when necessary to decide a justiciable claim. The court also considered the approach in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] 1 AC 374, including Lord Diplock’s focus on the consequences for the individual.
2. Application to forfeiture. The forfeiture process was governed by published guidance, a structured procedure and criteria capable of largely objective assessment. It was designed to operate independently of political decision-making and was not an exercise of the Sovereign’s personal gift. The process could support a procedural legitimate expectation that it would be followed. Revocation also carried significant reputational consequences. Those features made the recommendation reviewable in principle. The court distinguished the grant of an honour from its removal: there is no right or substantive legitimate expectation to receive an honour, but that does not determine whether a recipient has a procedural expectation concerning forfeiture. The approach in Black v The Advisory Council of the Order of Canada 2012 FC 1234 supported the procedural distinction. The court treated Senior-Milne v Advocate General for Scotland [2020] CSIH 39 as persuasive, but doubted its suggestion that grant and removal have no relevant difference. Any margin of appreciation and the merits of particular grounds were left to a later stage.
3. Human Rights Act claim. The common-law claim was justiciable, so there was no bar to the Convention claim being considered under the Human Rights Act 1998. The court did not decide whether that claim would be independently justiciable if the common-law claim were not. The preliminary issue was determined for the Claimant; the merits remained undecided.

First-instance judicial review. On 11 February 2026, HHJ Anthony Dunne, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, directed that justiciability be determined as a preliminary issue. Mrs Justice Lieven determined that issue; the merits were not decided.