Sergio Graft, R (on the application of) v The London Borough of Hammersmith & Fulham

Judicial review claimants must serve a sealed claim form within seven days. An extension requires the claimant to have taken all reasonable steps to comply but been unable to do so, and to have applied promptly. A litigant in person is subject to the same requirements. A prohibition order does not automatically require a higher housing-register band where the allocation scheme permits Band 2 for premises subject to such an order and remedial works remain possible. Homelessness duties arise only after an application for assistance; a statutory definition of homelessness does not itself trigger them. The public sector equality duty requires due regard, not elimination of discrimination. A court may await a specialist court’s determination of disputed access and repair issues where that is material to the public-law decision.

The claimant brought two judicial review claims against a local authority. The first challenged his Band 2 housing-register decision and alleged failures concerning disrepair, although it did not plead a substantive challenge to the Band 2 assessment. The sealed claim form was issued in January 2025 but not served. The second alleged continuing failures after a prohibition order, including enforcement, recognition of homelessness, and reconsideration of housing priority and review rights.

A deputy High Court judge refused permission on the papers on 2 July 2026. On renewal, the court considered service, the effect of the later order, disputed access and remedial works, the homelessness gateway, equality duties, and requests for an interpreter and intermediary. The central questions were whether the first claim could proceed despite late service and whether either claim disclosed an arguable public-law error.

The court considered two renewed applications for permission to apply for judicial review. The claimant declined to enter the courtroom, but the court considered his written materials and the adjustments it had offered.

1. In the first claim, the sealed claim form had to be served within seven days under the Civil Procedure Rules and the Administrative Court Guide. Applying the principles in CPR 7.6 to an application under CPR 3.1(2)(a), an extension required all reasonable steps to have been taken and a prompt application. The claimant had assumed that the court would serve the claim form, applied nearly a year later, and had still not provided the defendant with a full copy. The extension was refused, the claim form was set aside, and the court had no jurisdiction. The court added that, even if service had been valid, the grounds were unarguable. The court applied the principles discussed in R(on the application of The Good law Project) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care [2022] EWCA Civ 355.

2. The alleged enforcement failure in the first claim had been overtaken by the prohibition order. The claimant owed a duty of full candour and could not require the court to ignore that material development. The access dispute was being considered by the Magistrates’ Court under section 35 of the Housing Act 2004. The Administrative Court would not ordinarily resolve disputed evidence within that specialist jurisdiction, and the defendant was entitled to await the result before deciding on further enforcement.

3. A prohibition order did not automatically trigger a review of housing priority because the allocation scheme expressly included premises subject to such an order within Band 2. Band 1 required a category 1 hazard, a problem incapable of resolution by the landlord within six months, and a considerable health risk from continued occupation. The order contemplated remedial works, and the information before the defendant indicated that works and alternative accommodation remained possible. The defendant was therefore entitled to conclude that the claimant did not obtain higher priority merely because the works had not proceeded.

4. The 1999 review regulations had been revoked by regulation 11 of the Homelessness (Review Procedures etc.) Regulations 2018. In any event, the claimant had already obtained a review of the November 2024 decision and there had been no later housing-band decision requiring a further review. Section 175 of the Housing Act 1996 was definitional only. The homelessness duties in section 184 onwards arose only after an application for assistance under section 183, which the claimant had declined to make.

5. Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 required due regard to equality matters; it did not require the defendant to eliminate discrimination. The section 20 claim was incoherent and unarguable because the alleged provision, criterion or practice was new, unparticularised, and unrelated to the pleaded case. The Article 8 and Article 14 grounds depended on the same failed enforcement premise. Delay in the housing-register decision did not make the allocation unlawful where registration was backdated, and the housing-cost complaint was unparticularised.

6. New matters raised in later skeleton arguments were not considered because the claimant had not applied to amend his grounds under the Administrative Court Guide, Practice Direction 54A and CPR Part 23. Mental-health difficulties did not automatically establish a need for an intermediary or interpreter; the court could use pauses, breaks, explanations and other measures, but the applications required supporting evidence. The first claim was set aside, permission was refused in the second claim, and the defendant received a one-day extension for filing its acknowledgement of service.

1. Deputy High Court Judge, 2 July 2026: Permission was refused on the papers in both claims. Relief from sanctions for late service was also refused in the first claim.
2. High Court (Administrative Court), 22 September 2026: On renewal, the court set aside the first claim form for want of valid service and jurisdiction, and alternatively found the first claim unarguable. Permission was refused in the second claim.