Taylor Wimpey UK Limited v Taylor Woodrow Construction & Anor

A later claimant’s independent cause of action under the Defective Premises Act 1972 is not barred merely because a closely connected company’s claim for the same damage was dismissed in arbitration. A strike-out for abuse requires a broad, merits-based assessment of all the circumstances. The fact that a claim could have been raised earlier is not enough by itself; the applicant must establish manifest unfairness or that allowing the claim would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. A claimant’s own cause of action is not a collateral attack on an earlier award merely because the claims overlap, particularly where the claimant had no opportunity to participate and the earlier claim was dismissed on limitation grounds without deciding its merits.

Taylor Wimpey UK Limited (TWUK) brought a claim against Taylor Woodrow Construction for fire-safety defects in a residential development. TWUK claimed as a subsequent equitable owner under the Defective Premises Act 1972 and also sought a building liability order against the contractor’s parent company.

An associated company, Taylor Wimpey Developments Ltd (TWDL), had previously brought claims against the contractor in arbitration. Its claim under the Act was dismissed as time-barred before the Building Safety Act 2022 retrospectively extended the limitation period. The arbitrator later held that the extension did not revive TWDL’s finally determined claim. TWUK was not a party to the arbitration and had not pursued its own claim there.

The contractor applied to strike out TWUK’s claim as relitigation abuse and as a collateral attack on the arbitration awards. The central issue was whether TWUK’s separate claim could proceed despite the overlap with TWDL’s unsuccessful arbitration claim.

1. The strike-out application was dismissed. Under r.3.4(2)(b) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, the contractor bore the burden of showing abuse. The threshold was exacting: the court had to assess all the circumstances and ask whether relitigation would be manifestly unfair or bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The fact that a matter could have been raised earlier did not, by itself, make a later claim abusive. Culpable or improper conduct was not required.
2. Section 1 of the Defective Premises Act 1972 may impose duties on a builder to both the original employer and later persons who acquire an interest in a dwelling. Those claimants have independent causes of action and may each claim the full cost of repair, subject to protection against duplicate recovery. TWUK’s claim under s.1(1)(b) was distinct from TWDL’s employer claim under s.1(1)(a).
3. The companies’ close relationship did not make TWUK TWDL’s privy for this claim. Applying the approach in Gleeson v J Wippell & Co. Ltd [1977] 1 W.L.R. 510 and Resolution Chemicals Ltd v H Lundbeck A/S [2013] EWCA Civ 924, the court considered TWUK’s interest in the earlier dispute, whether it was in reality the party to that dispute, and whether it was just to bind it. The pleaded claim rested on TWUK’s independent statutory cause of action. The court left undecided whether the transfer agreement had assigned TWDL’s statutory claim.
4. The collateral-attack argument also failed. Mueed-Uddin v Home Secretary [2024] UKSC 21 confirmed that a claimant must have had a full opportunity to contest the earlier decision for Hunter abuse to arise. TWUK had no such opportunity and did not challenge the arbitrator’s limitation decisions. Those decisions did not determine the merits of TWDL’s DPA claim. Even if the present claim overlapped with issues considered in the tort arbitration, the circumstances did not make it manifestly unfair to require the contractor to answer the claim.
5. The court also rejected delay as a ground for strike-out. Parliament had retrospectively extended the limitation period for relevant DPA claims to 30 years. Prejudice from delay within that period could not justify striking out a claim brought within it. The court declined to bypass the procedure for summary judgment in Part 24 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998.

not stated in the judgment.