KGT & Ors v The Secretary of State for The Home Department

A court will generally not decide an academic public law claim merely to resolve a point of law that no longer affects the parties. It may do so exceptionally where there is sufficient reason in the public interest, but importance or possible recurrence within the same broad field is not enough by itself. The court must assess the likely utility of deciding the issue beyond the case, including whether it may resolve or materially assist another dispute and whether it can be determined without a detailed inquiry into facts particular to a dispute that is no longer live. A continuing statutory duty does not keep a challenge to an implemented decision live merely because consequences remain; later decisions are assessed by reference to their own circumstances and applicable duties.

Three asylum seekers challenged the process by which the Minister for Border Security and Asylum approved a tranche of asylum hotel closures, including the closure of the hotel where they were living. Their remaining grounds alleged inadequate inquiry and process irrationality, and breach of the public sector equality duty. Their individual accommodation challenges were no longer pursued. By the hearing, the closure had been implemented, the family had moved, and a fresh decision had been made about their accommodation. The court considered whether the two remaining grounds were academic and, if so, whether there was sufficient public interest to determine their merits. It also decided the Defendant’s application for relief from sanctions concerning a late skeleton argument.

1. Relief from sanctions. Applying Denton v TH White Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 906, the court granted an extension and relief for the late skeleton argument. The breach was neither serious nor significant. The short delay did not make compliance immaterial, but it caused no disruption to the hearing or material prejudice, and the Defendant gave an explanation.

2. Academic claims. The ordinary function of the court is to decide disputes affecting the parties’ rights and obligations. An academic claim will generally not be determined merely to resolve a point of law, although the court may do so exceptionally for sufficient reason in the public interest. The discretion is exercised cautiously. Relevant considerations include the likelihood that the same or similar issues will arise elsewhere and whether the issue can be decided without detailed examination of facts particular to a dispute that is no longer live: R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Salem [1999] 1 AC 450; R (Zoolife International Ltd) v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2007] EWHC 2995 (Admin) at [36]. Whether a claim is academic and whether the court should nonetheless determine it are distinct questions.

3. Ground 4. The challenge to the Tranche 3 decision was academic because the closure had taken place and deciding the ground would not change the claimants’ current accommodation or necessarily determine the lawfulness of any later decision. The court accepted that the duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 is continuing, but that did not give a challenge to the earlier implemented decision continuing practical effect. Although the issue was important and capable of determination without a highly fact-sensitive inquiry, the principles were established and no sufficient wider utility was shown. The court declined to determine the merits.

4. Ground 2B. This ground was also academic. A decision that further inquiries should have been made would not reverse the closure or alter the claimants’ present position; any future accommodation decision would be assessed in its own circumstances. The court declined to determine the merits because the adequacy of inquiry depended on the scale and nature of a decision, available information, the state of the accommodation estate and the risks apparent at the time. The possible recurrence of similar issues did not establish that deciding this completed, fact-sensitive challenge would materially assist another dispute.

5. The remaining claim was dismissed as academic. The court made no determination of the merits of either Ground 4 or Ground 2B.

The proceedings were commenced with an application for urgent interim relief. A prohibitory order was made on 5 May 2026, and permission to apply for judicial review was granted on 12 June 2026. No lower-court judgment was under appeal.