CGT, R (on the application of) v West Sussex County Council

Capital held in a personal injury trust must be disregarded when assessing an adult’s resources under the applicable charging regulations where the statutory wording adopts an unqualified disregard. The court cannot read an exception for sums allocated to future care costs into the provision merely because another provision contains such an exception.

The principle against double recovery ordinarily operates when damages are assessed against a tortfeasor. It does not authorise a local authority to refuse to perform statutory care and support duties or to recover funding already paid. Earlier undertakings concerning public funding do not alter the statutory scheme where they are personal, were not given to the local authority, and do not bind the current deputy.

The claimant, a protected adult with severe lifelong disabilities, received a substantial Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority award in 2012. The award, including a sum for future care, was placed in a personal injury trust. His mother gave undertakings concerning applications for public funding. After her death, his father became deputy and later sought local authority funding.

The defendant funded the claimant’s care on a discretionary and without-prejudice basis from July 2020. In June 2024 it decided to stop funding and demanded repayment, relying on the care allocation in the trust, the earlier undertakings and the prevention of double recovery. The claim for judicial review challenged that decision under the Care Act 2014 and related charging regulations.

1. Claim succeeded. The decisions to cease funding and demand repayment were unlawful. They were declared unlawful and quashed.
2. The relevant statutory scheme was the Care Act 2014, the Care and Support (Charging and Assessment of Resources) Regulations 2014 and the incorporated provisions of the Income Support (General) Regulations 1987. Regulation 18 and paragraph 15 of Schedule 2 required the value of a trust derived from a personal injury payment, and the right to receive payments under it, to be disregarded.
3. The language was clear, unambiguous and unqualified. It applied to the whole personal injury trust, including funds identified as meeting future care costs. The express care-cost exception in paragraph 16, which was absent from paragraph 15, demonstrated that Parliament had treated ordinary personal injury payments and personal injury trusts differently. The court declined to supply an exception through purposive interpretation or public policy.
4. The 2012 undertakings did not alter that conclusion. They were personal undertakings, given to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority rather than the defendant, and did not bind the claimant’s current deputy. The circumstances did not resemble the deliberate deception considered in Welwyn Hatfield. The defendant had therefore acted unlawfully in refusing to entertain the application on the correct statutory basis and in seeking repayment.
5. The double-recovery authorities concerned the assessment or approval of damages against a tortfeasor. They did not establish a duty on a local authority, when performing statutory functions, to prevent possible double recovery or to treat different public bodies and funding regimes as one. The reasoning in Tinsley was not materially confined to the Mental Health Act context.
6. The defendant had also failed to carry out the required formal financial assessment. It could not rely on section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 by positing a counterfactual in which it would have reached the same unlawful conclusion.
7. The court declined to refuse relief. The trust had been depleted by payments which would not otherwise have been made, and the defendant did not rely on resource constraints or other exceptional circumstances. The defendant was directed to pay £66,979.15 to the trust, subject to lawful contributions, and to pay the claimant’s costs on the standard basis.