Tinsley v Manchester City Council & Ors

A person entitled to after-care services under section 117 of the Mental Health Act 1983 cannot be refused those services because personal injury damages remain available to fund private care. Such a refusal would amount in substance to charging for services which must be provided without charge.

The principle against double recovery operates when damages are assessed. It does not subsequently prevent the claimant from applying for statutory after-care. Personal injury damages administered by the Court of Protection must be disregarded when the authority decides whether the person’s needs call for services.

Following a road traffic accident, the claimant developed an organic personality disorder and was detained under section 3 of the Mental Health Act 1983. He later received substantial damages, including the cost of future private care, in Tinsley v Sarkar [2005] EWHC 192.

Manchester City Council declined to provide section 117 after-care while those damages remained available. The Administrative Court held that this refusal was unlawful in [2016] EWHC 2855 (Admin). The council appealed, contending that section 117 did not require provision in these circumstances and that provision would offend the principle against double recovery.

The central issue was whether entitlement to statutory after-care depended upon exhaustion, or imminent exhaustion, of damages awarded for future care.

1. Appeal dismissed. Section 117 of the Mental Health Act 1983 required the relevant authorities to provide or arrange after-care services while the statutory need continued. The duty did not permit a local authority to refuse provision because the claimant possessed damages intended to meet future care costs. Refusal on that ground was effectively equivalent to providing the services and charging for them, contrary to R v Manchester City Council, ex p Stennett [2002] 2 AC 1127. [12–13]

2. Personal injury damages administered by the Court of Protection could not be considered at the threshold stage when deciding whether services should be provided. Crofton v NHSLA [2007] 1 WLR 923 supported that conclusion. It would be anomalous to disregard such damages for other community-care claimants but consider them for persons whose entitlement arose following compulsory detention. [14–16]

3. Section 47 of the National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990 did not permit an authority to accept a medical need for section 117 services yet decide that the same needs did not call for provision because damages were available. That construction improperly gave “need” different meanings within the statutory scheme. [17]

4. The principle against double recovery is addressed when damages are assessed against the tortfeasor. If it is clear at trial that the claimant will rely on local-authority provision, the claimant cannot also recover those care costs. An award of damages does not, however, thereafter preclude an application for section 117 services. [25–26]

5. Peters v East Midlands Strategic Health Authority [2010] QB 48 did not establish that a Court of Protection deputy must wait until damages are exhausted. Its discussion of undertakings controlling a future application for public funding was obiter, concerned different statutory wording, and protected the tortfeasor when damages were awarded. It did not determine the claimant’s later substantive entitlement against a local authority. [28–33]

6. Longmore LJ gave the judgment. Irwin LJ and the Master of the Rolls agreed. The Administrative Court’s conclusion that the council’s refusal was unlawful therefore stood. [33–37]

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The council’s appeal was dismissed in [2017] EWCA Civ 1704. The court held that the claimant’s unexhausted personal injury damages did not permit refusal of section 117 after-care.
• High Court, Administrative Court: HHJ Stephen Davies held in [2016] EWHC 2855 (Admin) that it was unlawful to refuse after-care because the claimant could fund care from his damages. Permission to appeal was granted.