Andrzej Domin v Polish Judicial Authority, Poland

For section 20 of the Extradition Act 2003, deliberate absence may be established by the information contained in a European arrest warrant where it clearly records personal service and the relevant consequences of non-attendance. The executing court need not investigate the underlying foreign proceedings unless the warrant is ambiguous or confusing. A person who actively participates in proceedings, agrees to conviction without trial, fails to maintain a required address and permits service at that address may knowingly waive the right to be present. Under Article 8, extradition involves a strong public interest. Where the requested person is a fugitive, very strong countervailing factors are required.

The applicant sought renewed permission to appeal against a District Judge’s order of 25 April 2025 ordering his extradition to Poland under a Part 1 European arrest warrant. The warrant concerned two Polish convictions for violent offending, with activated custodial sentences totalling one year and 11 months. The District Judge discharged the applicant in relation to a separate child-maintenance accusation, rejected his section 20 challenges and held extradition proportionate under Article 8.

The proposed appeal argued that the applicant had not been deliberately absent from either trial and that extradition would disproportionately interfere with his private and family life. The central issues were whether the section 20 bar applied and whether the Article 8 assessment disclosed an arguable error of law.

The renewed application for permission to appeal was refused. The proposed grounds did not identify any reasonably arguable error of law, misdirection, irrationality or material factual mistake.

1. Section 20. Section 20 of the Extradition Act 2003 required the Court to determine whether the applicant had deliberately absented himself from the trials resulting in his convictions. For the first conviction, the warrant clearly stated that he had been summoned in person, informed of the hearing and warned that proceedings might continue in his absence. There was no requirement to provide further service details in the relevant box of the warrant. Applying Cretu v Romania [2016] EWHC 353 (Admin) and Merticariu v Judecatoria Arad, Romania Supreme Court [2024] UKSC 10, the statement in the warrant was sufficient evidence unless ambiguity or confusion required further inquiry.
2. For the second conviction, the applicant had participated in the process, agreed with the prosecutor to conviction without trial, failed to notify the court of his change of address and did not collect correspondence sent to the address he had provided. The District Judge was entitled to find that this amounted to a knowing and deliberate absence. Bertino v Italy [2024] UKSC 9 was distinguishable because, in that case, the requested person could not have been aware of criminal proceedings when he left Italy.
3. Article 8. The District Judge correctly conducted a fact-sensitive proportionality assessment, taking account of time spent on remand, the applicant’s partner, delay, rehabilitation and established life in the United Kingdom. Those factors had to be balanced against the seriousness of the violent offending, the outstanding sentence and the public interest in extradition. Consistently with Norris v Government of the USA (No 2) [2010] 2 AC 487, H(H) v Italy Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa [2013] 1 AC 338 and Polish Judicial Authorities v Celinski [2016] 1 WLR 551, the applicant’s fugitivity meant that very strong countervailing factors were required. The District Judge’s conclusion that extradition was proportionate was plainly within the permissible range.

• District Judge’s Court: On 25 April 2025, District Judge Tempia ordered extradition to Poland, rejected the section 20 challenges and held extradition proportionate under Article 8. The applicant was discharged in relation to the child-maintenance accusation.
• High Court (Administrative Court): Permission to appeal was refused on paper on 15 December 2025 and refused again on renewal by Mr Justice Sweeting on 5 March 2026.