Jaysukh Ranpariya v Government of India

On an extradition appeal, permission should be granted only where the applicant can show that the district judge ought to have decided a question differently and would then have had to discharge the applicant. The appeal is not a rehearing or an invitation to reweigh evidence. Appellate intervention remains possible where the overall evaluation was wrong or crucial factors were materially misweighed.

In assessing an alleged risk of past torture, an approach developed for Refugee Convention claims is not automatically transferable where the fact-finding tribunal could determine whether the alleged torture occurred and that finding bears on another issue. A finding that past torture did not occur may preclude reliance on a supposed risk that it occurred. Detailed and specific diplomatic assurances may properly address risks concerning detention, medical care, suicide and remission.

The applicant sought renewal of permission to appeal against District Judge Griffiths’s order for his extradition to India to face charges including murder and conspiracy to murder. Permission had previously been refused on the papers.

The renewed application raised issues concerning the particularisation of the allegations, whether the conduct constituted extradition offences, the prima facie case, risks of torture and inadequate prison conditions, a possible irreducible life sentence, and whether extradition would be unjust or oppressive because of the applicant’s mental condition. The central question was whether any ground disclosed an arguable error of the kind required on an extradition appeal.

1. Permission was granted on Grounds 1–3 and Ground 5, subject to the qualification that Ground 5 could not rely on an alleged risk that the applicant had previously been tortured, because the District Judge had found that he had not been tortured. Permission was refused on Grounds 6–8.

2. The applicable appellate approach was that stated in Love v Government of the United States of America [2018] 1 WLR 2889 at [25]–[26]. The question was whether the District Judge ought to have decided a question differently and, if so, would have had to discharge the applicant. The court should respect factual findings, particularly where oral evidence had been heard. It should not conduct a rehearing or merely substitute a different assessment of the evidence.

3. Grounds 1 and 2 were arguable, particularly because the material concerning the alleged shooting of Professor Rajani appeared inconsistent as to whether the purpose was intimidation or killing. Ground 3 was also arguable. The admissibility of co-accused evidence under R v Pentonville Prison Governor, ex parte Schneider (1981) 73 Cr App R 200 could be examined, including its reliability in light of allegations that the co-accused had themselves complained of torture.

4. Ground 5 was arguable in light of Bhandari v India [2025] EWHC 449 (Admin) and evidence concerning the co-accused. However, Karanakaran v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] 3 All ER 449 and the approach derived from Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam [1999] FCA 719 were not apposite where the District Judge had made a direct factual finding and the finding was relevant to the alleged PTSD diagnosis. The District Judge’s rejection of the torture allegations was open to her.

5. There was no arguable error concerning prison conditions, medical care, suicide risk or section 91. The District Judge had directed herself correctly, considered the evidence, and was entitled to rely on detailed and specific assurances from India. Nor was there an arguable error concerning life without parole. The District Judge was entitled to reject the speculative possibility that a third party might successfully challenge the remission assurances.

• District Judge: ordered extradition to India after a 19-day hearing and found no Convention or statutory bar.
• High Court (Administrative Court): [2026] EWHC 682 (Admin) granted permission on Grounds 1–3 and 5, with a qualification concerning alleged past torture, and refused permission on Grounds 6–8.