Case details
Summary
On an appeal under Extradition Act 2003, fresh evidence will justify intervention only where it would have resulted in the extradition judge reaching a different decision and ordering discharge. For extradition to an ECHR and EU member state, the requested person must displace the presumption of compliance with clear, cogent and compelling evidence of a real risk of treatment contrary to article 3.
The real-risk assessment is prospective, intensely fact-sensitive and holistic. It concerns both the likelihood of the individual experiencing the treatment and the extent to which it would fall below article 3 standards. Evidence of overcrowding, isolation or double occupancy must be assessed in its specific factual context. The appeal was dismissed because neither the original nor fresh evidence established the necessary real risk.
Factual background
The appellant appealed under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against a District Judge’s decision ordering extradition to Sweden under two warrants. One warrant concerned prosecution for fraud; the other concerned service of the balance of an 18-month sentence.
Permission to appeal was granted only on the issue whether Swedish prison conditions created a real risk of treatment contrary to article 3 ECHR. The appellant also sought to rely on fresh reports concerning isolation, restrictions and double occupancy in Swedish prisons and detention centres. The central issues were whether the District Judge had reached the wrong conclusion on the evidence available at the hearing and whether the fresh evidence would have required a different decision.
Held
- Appeal and fresh evidence. The appeal was dismissed and the application to rely on the fresh evidence was refused. Under section 27(4) of the Extradition Act 2003, fresh evidence is relevant only if it would have resulted in the District Judge deciding the issue differently and ordering discharge. The statutory scheme narrowly confines appeals and promotes speed in extradition proceedings.
- Presumption of compliance and article 3. Sweden’s status as an ECHR signatory and EU member gave rise to a presumption that it would protect the appellant’s Convention rights. The burden was on the appellant to provide clear, cogent and compelling evidence demonstrating a real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. The evidence may come from authoritative reports and international material, but it must be sufficiently powerful and directed to the prospective position of the individual.
- Meaning of real risk. A real risk is less than a probability. The assessment addresses both the likelihood that the individual will be subjected to the treatment and the extent to which the treatment would fall below the article 3 minimum. The inquiry is prospective, intensely fact-sensitive and holistic. There is no bright-line rule concerning isolation, double occupancy or personal space.
- Evidence concerning isolation and restrictions. The evidence did not establish a real risk that the appellant would undergo the severe restrictive regime experienced during his earlier pre-trial detention. He was most likely to be held in prison in connection with the conviction warrant, without such restrictions. If detained on remand concerning the other warrant, the passage of time made equivalent restrictions unlikely, and any restrictions would be subject to judicial review and appeal.
- Double occupancy. The fresh OPCAT reports identified serious problems but presented a nuanced picture, including some benefits of shared cells and steps taken to address overcrowding. The evidence did not show a real risk of less than three square metres per prisoner, nor did the combined evidence establish sufficiently severe deficiencies in ventilation, sanitation, light, healthcare, cleanliness, exercise or purposeful activity. Accordingly, the fresh evidence would not have altered the District Judge’s decision under sections 21 or 21A.
The court’s approach to earlier authorities
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Appellate history
- High Court (Administrative Court): permission to appeal was refused on the papers by Sheldon J on 9 May 2025, but granted by Mould J on renewal on 1 December 2025 on ground 3 only. The appeal was dismissed and the application to rely on fresh evidence was refused.
- District Judge: following a hearing on 21 November 2024, the District Judge ordered extradition in a decision handed down on 18 December 2024.
Key cases cited
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