Emma Dawn McDaniel v Rosemary Geraldine Anne Talbot & Anor

Under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, an adult child’s need for maintenance is necessary but insufficient. The court must assess objectively whether the estate makes reasonable provision, considering all relevant statutory factors without a formulaic approach.

A blood relationship and financial need may be supplemented by a special circumstance. A recent, caring and mutually supportive father-daughter relationship may provide that additional factor, even where the claimant has earning capacity and the parties were historically estranged. Maintenance may include a capitalised sum for ordinary living expenses, debt repayment and a modest allowance for unforeseen expenditure.

Emma, the adult daughter of Mark Talbot, applied under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975. Mark’s will left his estate to his wife, Rosemary, and stated that he had no contact with Emma. The evidence showed that Mark and Emma had been estranged throughout most of Emma’s life but had re-established a close relationship before his death.

Emma maintained that the will failed to provide for her maintenance. Rosemary relied on the testamentary disposition, her own contribution to the family wealth, and Emma’s earning capacity. The issues were whether the estate made reasonable financial provision for Emma and, if not, what order should be made.

1. Claim succeeded. The court applied the two-stage statutory exercise: whether reasonable financial provision had been made, followed by the appropriate order. The factors in section 3 of the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 informed both stages, and the assessment was broad-brush rather than formulaic. Ilott v The Blue Cross & Ors [2017] UKSC 17 was applied.
2. For a non-spouse applicant, reasonable financial provision is limited to maintenance. Maintenance is directed to everyday living expenses and may be provided through a lump sum, including a sum used to secure housing or discharge debts where that relieves income expenditure. The court must assess the result objectively. It is not deciding merely whether the deceased acted reasonably in making the will.
3. Emma was necessitous. Her income broadly matched her evidenced outgoings, leaving no practical cushion. Her capacity to increase earnings was restricted by her own health problems, substantial caring responsibilities and the needs of her disabled sons. Bailey’s benefits, received by Emma as his appointee, were not generally available to the household.
4. Need and the qualifying relationship were not alone sufficient. The special circumstance was Emma’s caring contribution to Mark and to his mother, together with the warm, close father-daughter relationship re-established before Mark’s death. That relationship gave the claim a moral dimension, without the court finding that it created a freestanding moral obligation.
5. The testamentary intentions were relevant but carried reduced weight because the factual basis stated in the will—twenty years without contact—had been completely overtaken by the later relationship. Rosemary was sufficiently wealthy for an award not to compromise her standard of living.
6. A property-purchase order was disproportionate. The court ordered a discretionary trust providing £103,155, calculated to give Emma an annual cushion of approximately 10 per cent of her income, and a further £20,263.47 to discharge her debts other than the student loan. The total award was £123,418.47, approximately 8.2 per cent of the net estate.