Miles & Anor v Shearer

For an adult child, reasonable financial provision under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 is limited to provision for maintenance. It does not confer a general right to inherit or preserve an affluent lifestyle. Maintenance is assessed objectively by reference to the applicant’s circumstances and may include a lump sum which relieves recurring living expenditure, but not necessarily capital payments which merely improve financial security. The court must assess the applicant’s needs, the resources and needs of beneficiaries, the deceased’s current obligations and responsibilities, the estate, disability and other relevant matters. Past parental responsibilities which had ended before death are not revived. Where adult children had lived independently for many years without financial support, and had received a clear disclaimer of further responsibility, their claims may fail notwithstanding the size of the estate.

The claimants were the adult daughters of Anthony Presley Shearer. His will left the residue of his estate to his second wife, Pamela, and made no immediate provision for either daughter. The claimants sought reasonable financial provision under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975.

They claimed provision for housing, mortgage liabilities and other financial needs. The central issues were whether the will failed to make reasonable financial provision for their maintenance and, if so, what orders should be made.

1. Claims dismissed. The court held that neither claimant established that the will failed to make reasonable financial provision for her maintenance. The question of what order should be made therefore did not arise.
2. The statutory inquiry involves whether reasonable financial provision has been made and, if not, what provision should be made. Those questions often substantially overlap. The court should adopt the broad approach described in Ilott v Mitson (No 2) [2017] UKSC 17; [2018] AC 545.
3. Reasonable provision for an adult child is an objective standard. The question is not whether the deceased acted reasonably, although the deceased’s conduct and wishes may be relevant under section 3(1)(g) and section 3(1)(d). “Maintenance” concerns provision which enables the applicant to meet daily living expenses at an appropriate standard. A lump sum may qualify where it relieves recurring expenditure, such as by providing housing.
4. The standard is flexible and fact-sensitive. However, the position of adult children who had not been maintained by the deceased for almost ten years was materially different from that of a cohabitee maintained by the deceased at death, as in Negus v Bauhouse [2008] EWCA Civ 1002.
5. Payment of approximately £244,000 to convert an interest-only residential mortgage into a repayment mortgage was not shown to be maintenance. The claimant could instead consider reducing expenditure by moving to cheaper accommodation. A contingent liability to buy out a former spouse’s equity in 2034 was not a foreseeable financial need under section 3(1)(a) or (b).
6. Under section 3(1)(d), the relevant obligations and responsibilities are those existing at death. Defunct parental responsibilities from childhood or early adulthood cannot be revived. A clear disclaimer of further financial responsibility was relevant. In re Jennings decd. [1994] Ch 286 was applied.
7. The claimants’ adult status, earning potential, independent lifestyle choices, financial assistance from their mother and the deceased’s expressed testamentary wishes weighed against their claims. A grandchild’s disability did not make the grandchild an eligible applicant, although its effect on the claimant’s earning capacity could be considered.