Jane Oliver v Rodney William Oliver

A will that appears regular on its face attracts a presumption of due execution. That presumption is displaced only by the strongest evidence. Testamentary capacity requires the testator to understand the nature and effect of the will, the extent of the property disposed of, and the claims to which effect ought to be given, without mental disorder or delusion affecting the disposition.

Where a testator’s reasoning is impaired by cognitive dysfunction and dependence on another person, the testator may lack capacity even if able to understand the general nature of making a will. A testamentary disposition may alternatively be invalid for undue influence where pressure overbears the testator’s volition. On the facts, the later will was invalid and the earlier will was admitted to probate.

William Oliver died in 2018, leaving a 2015 will which placed his estate under discretionary trusts for the benefit initially of his eldest son, Rodney. His daughter Jane challenged that will on grounds of want of due execution, want of testamentary capacity, undue influence and fraudulent calumny. She also sought admission to probate of an earlier 2009 will.

Jane and her brother Kevin brought a separate claim under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, on the assumption that the 2015 will was valid. Rodney did not participate in the proceedings or attend trial. The central issues were whether the 2015 will was formally valid, whether William had testamentary capacity, and whether the will was procured by undue influence.

1. Formal validity. The 2015 will appeared regular on its face and contained a standard attestation clause. Under section 9 of the Wills Act 1837, the presumption of due execution applied. A puzzling medical-record note suggested that a witness may have signed later, but it did not amount to the strongest evidence required to rebut the presumption. The will was therefore treated as duly executed.
2. Testamentary capacity. Applying the test in Banks v Goodfellow, the burden of proving capacity lay on the person propounding the will, subject to the usual evidential presumption arising from due execution and apparent rationality. The claimants had raised more than a real doubt. William could understand the general nature of making a will and the broad extent of his property, but he could not properly comprehend and appreciate the claims of his children. His cognitive impairment prevented him from weighing relevant information, and he viewed the family dispute through Rodney’s perspective.
3. William also failed the fourth limb of the Banks test. Vascular cognitive impairment, brain disease and other medical conditions had materially reduced his executive functioning. His fixed and irrational beliefs about Andrew and Kevin were delusions which influenced the disposition. Had his natural faculties been intact, he would not have made the 2015 disposition.
4. Undue influence. Alternatively, the evidence established that Rodney had overborne William’s volition. William was physically frail, emotionally vulnerable, socially isolated and dependent on Rodney, who controlled access to him and assisted him in making the will. The will was therefore invalid for undue influence. It was unnecessary to decide fraudulent calumny.
5. Earlier will and outcome. The 2009 will was presumed valid and effective, and Rodney had raised no objection. The court ordered its reconstruction under rule 54 of the Non-Contentious Probate Rules 1987 and admitted it to probate in solemn form. The Inheritance Act claims fell away because they had been brought only on the footing that the 2015 will was valid.