Schrader v Schrader

Testamentary capacity requires understanding of the nature and effect of the act, the extent of the property and the claims deserving consideration, free from a disorder or delusion affecting the disposition. A will rational on its face attracts an initial presumption, but the court must assess all the evidence. Precise valuation is unnecessary, and an eccentric, unexplained or unwise disposition, frailty, or a change from an earlier will does not alone prove incapacity.

Knowledge and approval may be inferred from capacity, due execution and reading over, subject to scrutiny where circumstances arouse vigilance. Testamentary undue influence is a question of fact with no presumption. It requires coercion or fraud. Circumstantial evidence may suffice, and pressure which overbears free judgment is distinct from legitimate persuasion. The precise pressure need not be identified once the inference is established.

Jessica Schrader's 2006 will left Southend Farm House to her son Nick and the residue equally to Nick and Bill. Her 1990 will divided the value of the house through the residuary gift. Bill challenged the later will and propounded the 1990 will, alleging lack of testamentary capacity, lack of knowledge and approval, and undue influence.

The action was a first-instance probate trial. The central questions were whether Jessica understood and approved the 2006 dispositions and whether Nick had procured the gift of the house by coercion or fraud.

The court pronounced against the 2006 will and in favour of the 1990 will.

1. Capacity. Applying Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549, the court held that Jessica understood the nature and effect of making a will, the relevant property and the claims to be considered. A will rational on its face attracts a presumption of capacity, but that is only a working starting point. Rationality in context and all the evidence must still be considered. The court also held that precise knowledge of the property's value was unnecessary. Strange, unexplained, vindictive or unwise dispositions, changes from earlier wills and frailty did not, by themselves, establish incapacity. Re Loxston, Abbot v Richardson [2006] WTLR 1567 was distinguished on its facts.
2. Knowledge and approval. The court followed the approach summarised in Wharton v Bancroft [2011] EWHC 3250 (Ch). The relevant question was whether Jessica understood what she was doing and its effect so that the will represented her testamentary intentions. Her capacity, coherent instructions, the will's simplicity, due execution and the reading over of the will supported that conclusion. The strong inference and caution against speculative challenges described in Gill v Woodall [2011] Ch 380 were applied. The additional evidential considerations identified in Hoff v Atherton [2003] EWCA Civ 1554 were considered, but the circumstances did not displace the evidence of knowledge and approval.
3. Undue influence. Adopting the principles stated in Edwards v Edwards [2007] WTLR 1387, the court held that testamentary undue influence is not presumed and must be proved as a question of fact by evidence of coercion or fraud. Pressure that overbears free judgment is coercion, whereas legitimate persuasion is insufficient. Circumstantial evidence may establish the case. Jessica's vulnerability and dependency, Nick's forceful personality, his involvement in the preparation of the will, the inaccurate reason given for the gift and his conduct in concealing the will justified the inference that he had taken advantage of her vulnerability. It was unnecessary to identify the precise form or occasion of the pressure.

not stated in the judgment.