Catherine Jones & Ors. v Ceri Jones

Testamentary capacity remains governed by the common-law test in Banks v Goodfellow, rather than the decision-making test in the Mental Capacity Act 2005. Capacity concerns the potential to understand the will and its immediate effects; it is not equivalent to memory. Knowledge and approval require a holistic assessment of the evidence, including suspicious circumstances. Testamentary undue influence has no presumption. The claimant must prove coercion or fraud, and that the facts are inconsistent with any other explanation. Pressure may amount to coercion where it overbears the testator’s free judgment, particularly where the testator is vulnerable. A will made under such influence is invalid.

Daphne Jones made a short will appointing her daughter Ceri Jones as executor and sole beneficiary of her estate. The will was witnessed by a neighbour and an accountant, without involvement of a solicitor or a contemporaneous medical assessment. Mrs Jones had vascular dementia, physical vulnerabilities and a history of strokes and transient ischaemic attacks.

Her other daughters and grandchildren challenged the will, alleging lack of testamentary capacity, lack of knowledge and approval, and undue influence. The central issues were whether Mrs Jones had capacity and understood the will when she signed it, and whether Ceri Jones had procured it by coercion or fraud.

1. Testamentary capacity. The court applied the established test in Banks v Goodfellow: the testator must understand the nature and effects of the act, the extent of the property, and the claims to which proper consideration should be given, without a disorder of mind poisoning the affections or perverting the sense of right. Sections 2 and 3 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 concern decision-making for living persons and do not replace that test.
2. Capacity concerns potential understanding and is not equivalent to memory. Proof of actual understanding is not always required. The law does not require understanding of collateral consequences beyond the immediate consequences of the disposition. Applying that approach, the judge found that Mrs Jones understood the short and straightforward will and the relevant claims when she signed it.
3. Knowledge and approval. The court considered holistically whether Mrs Jones understood the will and its effect. Although the circumstances were suspicious because no solicitor was involved and no medical examination occurred at execution, the suspicion was dispelled by the accepted evidence that Mrs Jones told the accountant what to put in the will.
4. Undue influence. There is no presumption of undue influence in relation to a testamentary disposition. The burden rested on the claimants to show that the facts were inconsistent with any explanation other than undue influence. The relevant influence was coercion, meaning pressure which overbore the testator’s volition without convincing her judgment, or fraud. The test included the testator’s physical and mental strength and the possibility that sustained pressure could wear down a vulnerable person’s will.
5. The cumulative circumstances established coercion. Ceri Jones had a settled desire to inherit the house, isolated Mrs Jones from her close family, conveyed false allegations about money, exercised influence while Mrs Jones was grieving and vulnerable, was likely involved in replacing the solicitor, and arranged execution without independent legal or medical involvement. Mrs Jones therefore did not act as a free agent. The will was invalid and the estate was held on intestacy.
6. Ceri Jones accepted that money remaining in her mother’s account belonged to the estate. No occupation-rent order was made because the evidence and submissions were insufficient, and the general rule was that occupation rent is not payable between beneficiaries absent conduct making it fair.