Beryl Anne Myers v (1) Holt William Myers (2) Frederick Hugh Myers (3) Heather Rosemary Jane Turley (4) Eileen Myers

Under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, an adult child need not establish a special moral obligation before the court can find that a will fails to make reasonable financial provision. Section 3(1) supplies a complete list of relevant matters. No factor has automatic priority, and each receives the weight warranted by the facts. For a non-spouse, provision is confined to reasonable maintenance, not redistribution of the estate or a reward. Maintenance may include housing and capitalised income sufficient for a decent and comfortable life, but not every desirable benefit. Severe retirement insecurity, mental fragility, substantial wealth and the limited force of the deceased’s complaints justified provision despite a substantial lifetime gift.

The claimant, an adult daughter of the deceased’s first marriage, brought a claim under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975. The deceased had made no testamentary provision for her, although he had transferred valuable shares to her during his lifetime. His estate exceeded £8 million. The claimant was aged 60, had limited income, health problems, debts and insecure housing in Paris. The defendants, children of the deceased’s second marriage, were financially secure. The central issues were whether the will made reasonable financial provision for the claimant’s maintenance and, if not, what provision was reasonable.

1. Outcome. The claim succeeded. The court held that the deceased’s will did not make reasonable financial provision for the claimant’s maintenance under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975.
2. Applicable principles. For an applicant other than a spouse, the statutory jurisdiction is limited to reasonable maintenance. It is not a power to award a legacy, reward meritorious conduct or divide the estate fairly. The assessment is objective, although an express reason for excluding an applicant may be relevant. The factors in section 3(1) form a complete list, but they have no hierarchy. An adult child is not subject to an automatic additional threshold based on moral obligation or special circumstances, and the court should not approach an earning applicant with a preconceived heavy burden. The weight of each factor depends on the circumstances.
3. Application. The claimant’s severe financial insecurity, lack of pension, limited accommodation and substantial liabilities weighed heavily in her favour. Her mental fragility had materially affected her employment history. Her conduct had been less serious than the deceased believed, and the estate was sufficiently large to meet the needs of all concerned. These matters outweighed the lifetime gift of shares and the claimant’s shortcomings in making provision for herself.
4. Nature and calculation of maintenance. Maintenance means provision enabling daily living at an appropriate standard. It is more than subsistence but not every desirable benefit. Housing and capitalised income may be provided by lump sum. The court awarded £275,000 on life trusts for accommodation, £20,000 for furnishing and equipment, £21,500 towards living-cost debts and £200,000 for capitalised income needs. The Duxbury approach, using the 3.75 per cent real return adopted in Re Scott-Kilvert, Robinson v Fernsby, was preferred to the Ogden tables. A £24,744 single premium for future care was refused as outside reasonable maintenance in the circumstances.
5. Trust terms. The housing and maintenance fund was confined to maintenance and was not to provide a windfall. The trustees had power to apply capital for maintenance during the claimant’s lifetime. From her 88th birthday, if she lived that long, they were required on request to apply such capital as was reasonably required for maintenance, having regard to her other resources. The final order was made in the terms stated in paragraph [96], as modified by paragraph [100].