Baynes v Hedger & Ors

Under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, a claimant must show both eligibility and that the deceased was making substantial contributions towards the claimant’s reasonable needs immediately before death. Earlier gifts, terminated arrangements and assets transferred into a separate trust do not ordinarily satisfy that requirement. Actual maintenance raises a rebuttable presumption that responsibility was assumed, but a clear time limit or disclaimer may rebut it.

For a non-spouse claimant, reasonable provision is assessed objectively and is limited to maintenance. Payment of debts qualifies only where it enables the claimant to derive future income, or represents living expenses incurred after death. The court must balance the claimant’s needs against the estate, other beneficiaries, the deceased’s responsibilities and the claimant’s conduct.

Mary Spencer Watson died leaving a will which gave the Dunshay Manor Estate to the Landmark Trust and the residue to Margaret Baynes for life, with the remainder to her children. Henrietta Baynes and Margaret claimed under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975.

Margaret claimed that she had lived with Mary in the same household as civil partners and that Mary had maintained her. Henrietta claimed that Mary had maintained her and that the will failed to make reasonable financial provision for her maintenance. The court also determined how debts and administration expenses were to be borne and whether the will required rectification.

1. Construction of the will. The gift of the Dunshay Manor Estate to the Landmark Trust was an absolute gift, subject to abatement only if the residue was insufficient to meet debts and expenses. Debts and administration expenses were therefore payable out of residue. The question of rectification did not arise.
2. Margaret’s eligibility. Whether parties live in the same household is essentially a question of fact. The court may consider earlier events to explain the relevant period, and temporary physical separation does not necessarily end a household. Here, however, Mary and Margaret had separate homes, separate domestic economies and a settled pattern of visiting one another. Their relationship was also private and unacknowledged as a couple. Margaret therefore did not satisfy section 1(1B) of the Act.
3. Margaret was not being maintained by Mary immediately before death. A one-off gift of a house made decades earlier was not continuing maintenance. Nor did payments from the 1972 settlement come from Mary personally; they came from the trust. Mary’s remaining contributions were not substantial.
4. Henrietta’s eligibility. Maintenance must be assessed by reference to the actual arrangements subsisting immediately before death, rather than unimplemented promises. The 2003 agreement that there would be no further assistance, the time-limited mortgage payments in 2005 and the loans repayable from the sale of property did not form part of the settled arrangement at death. The remaining soft loans and payments were, by a narrow margin, substantial contributions otherwise than for full valuable consideration. Henrietta was therefore eligible to apply.
5. Reasonable provision. The court’s task was first to decide objectively whether the will failed to make reasonable provision for Henrietta’s maintenance, and only then, if necessary, whether to exercise the discretion under section 2. Maintenance is broad but does not ordinarily include paying accumulated debts. A debt payment qualifies only where it enables future income to be derived, or represents living expenses incurred after death.
6. Henrietta had received substantial lifetime assistance, including property and financial support. Mary had not placed her in a position of dependency, had expressly disclaimed responsibility for her continuing support and had sought principally to discharge existing debts. Henrietta’s conduct in pressing Mary for further assistance was a relevant countervailing factor. The will did not fail to make reasonable provision for her maintenance.
7. Both claims were dismissed. Debts and administration expenses were declared payable out of residue.