Jelley v Iliffe

For an application by a dependant under Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, section 1(3) provides the exhaustive meaning of being maintained. Rent-free accommodation may be a substantial contribution in money’s worth towards reasonable needs. The court must make a broad, common-sense comparison between what each party contributed, including non-financial services and companionship.

Actual maintenance will generally support an inference that the deceased assumed responsibility for it. A separate overt undertaking is not normally required. An application should be struck out only where it is plainly bound to fail. An arguable dispute about dependency or full valuable consideration must proceed to a hearing.

The appellant had lived for about eight years with the deceased, his sister-in-law. They pooled their pensions and he received rent-free accommodation in her house. He claimed that he had also contributed money, household improvements, companionship and practical assistance.

The deceased’s will left her estate, principally the house, to her three children. The appellant applied for provision as a dependant under Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975. A district registrar struck out the application, and Bush J dismissed the appellant’s appeal.

The central issue was whether the affidavit evidence disclosed an arguable case that the deceased had maintained the appellant, rather than a case bound to fail because their contributions were equal or he had given full valuable consideration.

1. The appeal was allowed unanimously. Lord Justice Stephenson gave the principal judgment. Lord Justice Cumming-Bruce agreed with it and with Lord Justice Griffiths’s judgment. The originating application was restored because it was not plainly bound to fail.

2. Section 1(3) of Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 exhaustively defines when a person is being maintained for section 1(1)(e). The court must examine the settled maintenance arrangement, rather than a temporary interruption immediately before death. Full valuable consideration is not confined to contractual consideration.

3. The court disagreed with Re Beaumont on the need for an independently demonstrated assumption of responsibility. Where a deceased in fact maintained an applicant on a settled basis, the court will generally infer that responsibility was undertaken. The inference may be rebutted, for example where the deceased made clear that the support could not be relied upon, but a further overt act is not ordinarily necessary.

4. Rent-free accommodation for a pensioner was capable of being a substantial contribution in money’s worth. The inquiry required a broad and common-sense balancing of that benefit against the applicant’s financial and non-financial contributions. It was not an exact exercise in valuing services in pounds and pence.

5. The evidence left open the possibility that the deceased’s contributions exceeded those made by the appellant. The applicant might ultimately fail, and matters including his conduct, the children’s interest in the house and the small estate would be relevant to discretionary relief. Those matters did not justify striking out an arguable claim. There was no order as to costs, and leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.

• Court of Appeal: Allowed the appellant’s appeal and restored his application for provision from the deceased’s estate.
• High Court, Family Division: Bush J dismissed the appellant’s appeal from the district registrar and refused leave for a further appeal.
• Family Division, Coventry District Registry: The district registrar struck out the appellant’s application as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.