Lindop v Agus & Ors

Eligibility under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 depends on the statutory criteria applied to the whole evidential picture. Whether parties lived in the same household is essentially a question of fact. Relevant considerations include permanence, intimacy, mutual support, domestic arrangements and community of resources. Two properties or a retained postal address do not necessarily establish separate households. Whether parties lived as husband and wife requires a relationship sufficiently analogous to marriage, but openness to public authorities is evidence rather than an invariably decisive requirement. Maintenance is established where, without full valuable consideration, the deceased made a substantial contribution in money or money’s worth towards the claimant’s reasonable needs.

Louise Lindop applied for reasonable financial provision from Paul Hedley’s estate under section 1(1A) and section 1(1)(e) of the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975. The executors disputed her eligibility. They argued that she had not lived with the deceased in the same household as his wife for the required two-year period and had not been maintained by him otherwise than for full consideration.

The central issues were whether the parties formed one household and lived as husband and wife, and whether the deceased had made substantial contributions towards the claimant’s reasonable needs.

1. Section 1(1A). The claim under section 1(1A) succeeded. Whether two people live in the same household is essentially a question of fact. The court must assess the whole relationship, including stability, sexual relationship, financial support, shared domestic life, care of children, public acknowledgement and the existence of a common domestic economy. Two properties do not necessarily mean two households.
2. The parties had lived under the same roof at 55 Church Street for at least two years before the deceased’s death. The claimant’s retention of her father’s address for postal and official purposes was relevant but not decisive. The electoral register and other documentary evidence had to be weighed against the oral and corroborative evidence. Her conduct was consistent with a person seeking security after a difficult divorce and did not prevent the relationship from being one resembling marriage.
3. Section 1(1)(e). The claim under section 1(1)(e) also succeeded. Under section 1(3), the question was whether, otherwise than for full valuable consideration, the deceased made a substantial contribution in money or money’s worth towards the claimant’s reasonable needs. The deceased provided accommodation, paid household outgoings, provided transport, paid for holidays and clothes, and made other gifts.
4. The executors’ contention that the claimant might have given full consideration was speculative. The court was entitled to decide the issue on the evidence available. Neither party had produced potentially relevant bank statements, and no application for specific disclosure had been made. The absence of disclosure could not be relied on by the executors to show that the claimant had failed to discharge the burden of proof.

The claimant was therefore eligible to make a claim under both statutory provisions.

First-instance decision. No appellate history was stated in the judgment.