Baynes v Hedger & Anor

Eligibility under section 1(1)(e) of the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 requires more than a substantial contribution to reasonable needs. The deceased must also have assumed responsibility for the applicant’s maintenance. Actual maintenance may raise a rebuttable presumption, but temporary, repayable and stop-gap assistance, given only on request, may rebut it.

Unimplemented promises are irrelevant to maintenance in fact. A prospective payment of existing debts does not ordinarily amount to maintenance. The statutory assessment of reasonable financial provision requires a value judgment on all relevant circumstances, including the deceased’s obligations and the applicant’s conduct.

Mary Spencer Watson’s will left a small pecuniary legacy to her god-daughter, Henrietta Baynes, devised the principal asset, Dunshay Manor Estate, to the Landmark Trust, and left the residue for the life benefit of Baynes’s mother and then certain of her siblings. Baynes claimed reasonable financial provision as a person maintained by the deceased under section 1(1)(e) of the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975.

Lewison J held that Baynes had been partly maintained immediately before the death but that the will made reasonable financial provision. He dismissed the claim. Baynes appealed. Landmark, by a late respondent’s notice, contended that Baynes had not qualified to apply because Mary had never assumed responsibility for her maintenance.

The central issue was whether temporary financial help and discussions about discharging debts established the assumed responsibility required for eligibility under section 1(1)(e).

1. Appeal dismissed. The court extended time for Landmark’s respondent’s notice. Although there was no good reason for its lateness, Baynes suffered no prejudice and its point was closely interwoven with the appeal.

2. A claimant under section 1(1)(e) of the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 must show that the deceased assumed responsibility for the claimant’s maintenance. This is an essential condition of eligibility, as well as substantial contributions otherwise than for full valuable consideration. Re Beaumont and Jelley v Iliffe established that proposition. Actual maintenance may give rise to a rebuttable presumption of assumed responsibility.

3. Lewison J’s findings demonstrated that Mary had not assumed that responsibility. The assistance was temporary, often expressly repayable, conditional on expected recoveries, and provided only when Baynes asked. Mary expressly disclaimed ongoing support and wished Baynes to support herself after her debts had been cleared. The judge’s conclusion that Baynes was eligible was therefore wrong.

4. Proposals and discussions in January and February 2006 could not alter that result. Unimplemented promises were irrelevant to maintenance in fact. Mary did not make a firm commitment, and payment of existing debts would not ordinarily be maintenance.

5. In any event, the Chancellor agreed with Lewison J’s assessment that the will did not fail to make reasonable financial provision. The judge had weighed all relevant circumstances, including Baynes’s financial position, Mary’s limited obligations, the preservation of the estate, other beneficiaries’ needs, and Baynes’s pressure on Mary. No appellate basis existed to disturb that value judgment.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): dismissed Baynes’s appeal, holding that she did not qualify under section 1(1)(e) of the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975. [2009] EWCA Civ 374
• High Court, Chancery Division (Lewison J): on 14 July 2008, dismissed Baynes’s claim. He found her eligible to apply but held that the will made reasonable financial provision. Lewison J refused permission to appeal on 23 July 2008.