Judith Allison Pearson v Chief Constable of Essex Police & Anor

Meaning in defamation is determined objectively by the natural and ordinary meaning conveyed by the words read as a whole to the hypothetical ordinary reasonable reader. A police investigation of an alleged offence ordinarily conveys a Chase Level 3 meaning, not that there were reasonable grounds to suspect guilt, unless the publication goes further. References to procedure, legal advice and prosecutorial involvement do not necessarily elevate the meaning. A later statement that an investigation has ended with no further action may be a complete antidote to the earlier imputation. Saying that an account is false does not, without more, mean that it was intentionally false. Whether such a meaning is defamatory may depend on the claimant’s identity, occupation and the evidence at trial.

The claimant, a journalist and columnist, brought libel and other claims against the Chief Constable of Essex Police and Roger Hirst concerning police press statements, a radio interview and an online article relating to an investigation into an alleged offence of inciting racial hatred.

On preliminary issues ordered by Collins Rice J, the court had to determine the natural and ordinary meaning of the publications and whether those meanings were defamatory at common law. The issue whether the police publications referred to the claimant was reserved for trial.

1. General principles. The court applied the objective natural-and-ordinary-meaning test. The hypothetical reader or listener is neither avid for scandal nor naïve, and the publication must be read as a whole. The court also applied the consensus requirement and threshold of seriousness for common-law defamation.
2. Essex Police press statements. The publications of 13 and 16 November 2024 conveyed that there were grounds to investigate a woman for an alleged offence of inciting racial hatred linked to a social-media post. They conveyed a Chase Level 3 meaning. References to voluntary interview, legal advice, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and consultation with the Crown Prosecution Service were consistent with ordinary investigative procedure and did not imply reasonable grounds for suspecting guilt.
3. The statement of 21 November 2024 conveyed that there had been grounds to investigate, but that, following the investigation, there was no basis for further action. The statement was not defamatory because the words “no further action” operated as a complete antidote to the earlier low-level imputation.
4. The press statements also conveyed that the woman had provided a false account of her interaction with the police. “False” meant not true or inaccurate and did not necessarily mean intentionally false. Whether that meaning was defamatory could not be decided abstractly. It depended in part on evidence concerning whether readers would identify the woman as the claimant and know that she was a journalist and columnist.
5. Mr Hirst’s interview. The interview conveyed that, in light of the complaint and the social-media post, there were reasonable grounds to investigate Ms Pearson for inciting racial hatred. It did not convey that there were reasonable grounds to suspect that she had committed the offence. The meaning was defamatory at Chase Level 3.
6. Conservative Home article. The article conveyed that there were grounds to investigate whether Ms Pearson had committed a hate-speech offence. It likewise conveyed a Chase Level 3 meaning and was defamatory.
7. The court rejected formulations based on the police having “assessed” or “properly concluded” that conduct justified investigation, because a pleaded meaning must identify the defamatory act, condition or attribute rather than a report of the defendant’s assessment. The preliminary determinations were made as set out above.