Sevenoaks District Council v Patrick Delaney & Ors

In contempt proceedings for breach of an injunction, liability is determined by whether the order was properly served, whether the defendant intentionally performed a prohibited act or failed to perform a required act, and whether the defendant knew the facts making that conduct a breach. The criminal standard applies. Knowledge of the order’s detailed meaning and subjective understanding ordinarily concern sanction rather than liability. A human-rights or public-law challenge cannot be introduced as an intermediate stage in determining contempt. Such matters should be raised promptly by seeking to vary or set aside the injunction. A later order permitting occupation has prospective effect unless it clearly operates retrospectively. A defence based on an honest belief formed in the heat of the moment is narrow.

The Council sought to enforce interim injunctions made by Dove J and varied by Hill J after four Traveller families bought agricultural land and moved onto it to establish a settled base. The orders prohibited unauthorised development, preparatory works and, initially, occupation. The Council alleged that the men and women continued occupation and carried out works after service.

The defendants relied on illiteracy, lack of explanation of the orders, welfare and human-rights considerations, necessity, and the later variation permitting occupation. The central issues concerned contempt liability, knowledge and service, the temporal effect of the Hill order, and whether particular works fell within the injunction.

1. Liability. The court rejected an intermediate human-rights defence. Liability required the disciplined inquiry identified in Re L-W (Children) (Enforcement and Committal: Contact) [2010] EWCA Civ 1253 and Cuadrilla Bowland v Persons Unknown [2020] EWCA Civ 9: whether the order was served, whether the defendant intentionally did the prohibited act or failed to do the required act, and whether the defendant knew the facts making the conduct a breach. The applicant bore the burden and the criminal standard applied.
2. Knowledge and public-law matters. Service, rather than proof that the defendant understood the order’s contents, was sufficient for liability. Subjective understanding, illiteracy and knowledge of breach were principally relevant to sanction. Article 8, equality duties and welfare enquiries could bear on whether an injunction should be made, varied or set aside, and on sanction, but not on liability.
3. Hill order. Its permission for occupation was prospective. It did not retrospectively authorise occupation between service of the Dove order and the Hill order. Ownership of the land did not prevent an injunction restraining occupation.
4. Sheffield defence. Sheffield City Council v Brooke [2018] EWHC 1540 (QB) recognised that an honest belief, formed in the heat of the moment, that action was necessary in defence of another could negate intentional breach. That principle did not apply to planned works or repairs.
5. Findings. The defendants were in contempt for occupation and for development or preparatory works after service, including moving a shed, installing connecting pipes and laying drainage works. The court was not satisfied to the criminal standard about junction boxes, some cabling, CCTV, floodlights, septic-tank repairs, steps or replacement of a mobile home. Mr Quilligan was separately in contempt for laying surfacing outside his caravan. Sanction was adjourned.

First-instance contempt proceedings. Interim injunctions were made by Dove J and varied by Hill J. An earlier application to vary the orders was dismissed by Deputy High Court Judge Darlow KC. This judgment determined liability and adjourned sanction.