Mid-Bedfordshire District Council v Brown & Ors

When exercising its discretion under section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, the court must balance planning enforcement, individual hardship and Convention rights. However, deliberate and unexplained defiance of a properly served court order is a powerful public-interest consideration. The court should not suspend an injunction in a way which permits an offender to retain the benefit obtained through contempt, undermines respect for court orders, or subverts the rule of law.

A short suspension may nevertheless be appropriate where it is needed solely to enable practical compliance and causes no irremediable harm.

The Council, as local planning authority, sought an injunction under section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 after the respondents used agricultural land in the green belt as an unauthorised residential caravan site.

An interim injunction had prohibited caravans and residential use. After it was served, the respondents moved caravans onto the land, began living there and submitted a planning application. Tugendhat J granted a final prohibitory injunction but suspended it pending determination of that application, principally because of hardship to the respondents and their young children.

The Council appealed against the suspension. The central issue was whether the discretion to suspend had been exercised properly in light of the respondents’ deliberate breach of the earlier court order.

Appeal allowed. The court discharged the suspension ordered below, while suspending the injunction for four weeks to permit practical arrangements for departure from the land.

1. Section 187B gave the court a discretion to grant, refuse, suspend or postpone an injunction. The exercise required a balance of the planning merits, the seriousness of the breach, personal hardship, the availability of alternative sites, the interests of children and compatibility with article 8 of the European Convention.

2. The applicable principles had been settled in South Bucks DC v. Porter [2003] 2 AC 558. They did not require suspension in circumstances where the respondents had deliberately created the very residential occupation which the interim injunction was designed to prevent.

3. The respondents had been told how to challenge or vary the interim order and did neither. They instead acted in deliberate breach of it, without explanation or apology, to secure occupation before the planning application was determined.

4. Suspension pending the planning decision would allow the respondents to retain the benefit of their breach. It risked conveying that contempt of court could be tolerated and made profitable. The resulting damage to the authority of the court and the rule of law outweighed the factors favouring suspension, including the hardship to the children.

5. A limited suspension was nevertheless appropriate to allow reasonable time to remove the caravans and vehicles. The final injunction therefore took effect after four weeks.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed the Council’s appeal, discharged the suspension pending the planning application, and suspended the injunction for four weeks only.
• Queen’s Bench Division: Tugendhat J, by order of 10 September 2004, granted a final injunction restraining residential use of the land but suspended it pending determination of the planning application.