South Bedfordshire District Council v Price & Ors

Where a planning injunction restrains residential use of land in breach of planning control, a later change in planning policy and evidence of unmet accommodation need do not by themselves justify suspending the injunction or its committal sanction. The court must assess the prospects of the pending planning appeal. Suspension pending that appeal is justified only where the evidence shows a substantial likelihood that permission will succeed, including temporary permission where that is the case advanced.

The public interest in preventing continued unlawful use may justify maintaining the sanction, while allowing a separate and more limited suspension of committal in respect of land-restoration obligations where that would not materially prejudice enforcement.

The Council obtained an injunction under section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 requiring the Defendants to cease residential use of land, remove structures and restore the land. The injunction followed an unsuccessful planning appeal and expired compliance periods.

Bean J refused to discharge, vary or suspend the injunction and made a committal order, suspended for two months, with additional time for restoration: [2005] EWHC 2031 (QB). The Defendants appealed against the committal order and sought permission to appeal against refusal to suspend the injunction. Before the Court of Appeal, they relied on the shortage of gypsy accommodation, a new planning circular and the prospect of temporary planning permission. The central issue was whether the committal sanction should be suspended pending the planning appeal.

1. Disposition. Lord Justice Lloyd, with Lord Justices Latham and Ward agreeing, dismissed the appeal against the committal order and refused permission to appeal against the refusal to suspend the injunction.
2. The judge had correctly approached the application. A shortage of accommodation, the prospect of further sites, the Defendants’ personal circumstances and a local authority’s acceptance of a need for additional pitches did not, without more, justify tolerating continued use of land already determined to be unsuitable and subject to an injunction. The judge had derived support for requiring strong justification from Mid Bedfordshire District Council v Brown [2004] EWCA Civ 1709.
3. The new Circular 01/06 improved the planning case because planning authorities were directed to give substantial weight to unmet need when considering temporary permission. It did not, however, permit the court to assume that the planning appeal would succeed. Planning merits remained matters for the planning process.
4. Given the history of defiance, suspension pending the planning appeal required evidence showing a substantial likelihood that the appeal would succeed, at least to the extent of a temporary permission. The evidence showed an improved chance, but not particularly strong prospects. The injunction therefore remained in force and the Defendants could not return to the property pending the planning appeal.
5. The court regarded the obligation to restore the land as materially different from the obligations to cease residential use and remove the caravans and structures. The public interest in preventing unlawful use was the immediate priority. Subject to further submissions, committal for restoration could appropriately remain suspended until the planning appeal was determined, with the sanction then taking effect after a specified period if restoration was not completed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The appeal from Bean J’s decision was dismissed. Permission to appeal against refusal to suspend the injunction was refused. The Court of Appeal left open further submissions concerning the duration of the suspension of committal in respect of restoration of the land.
• High Court, Queen’s Bench Division: Bean J refused to discharge, vary or suspend the injunction and made a committal order, suspended for two months, with a further month for restoration: [2005] EWHC 2031 (QB).