South Bedfordshire District Council v Price & Ors

An injunction restraining residential occupation in breach of planning control is a discretionary remedy, but a later committal court does not ordinarily reconsider whether the injunction should have been granted. The order is presumed properly made unless the defendant establishes a proper basis for discharge.

Prolonged and deliberate breach will ordinarily justify coercive sanctions. A shortage of authorised sites, unmet accommodation needs, uncertain planning prospects and family hardship do not, without more, require suspension or non-enforcement. Cases in which no sanction is imposed are exceptional and depend on exhaustive, reasonable efforts to relocate and the practical impossibility of compliance. A short period may be allowed for compelling personal circumstances.

The claimant local authority obtained planning enforcement measures against the defendants’ unauthorised residential occupation of land in the Green Belt. Following unsuccessful planning appeals, Pitchers J granted an injunction requiring the defendants to cease residential use, remove the caravans and structures, and restore the land.

The defendants did not comply. The claimant applied for suspended committal orders. The defendants sought discharge or suspension of the injunction, relying on the prospect of further planning proceedings, the shortage of sites for gypsies and travellers, and the personal circumstances of family members and children.

The court determined whether the defendants were in contempt, whether the injunction should be discharged or suspended, what sanction was appropriate, and what period should be allowed for compliance.

1. Contempt. The defendants had deliberately and persistently failed to comply with Pitchers J’s injunction. The breach was not merely technical. They had remained on the land and had carried out further works.
2. Discharge. An injunction restraining breach of planning control is discretionary, as explained in South Bucks DC v Porter [2003] 2 AC 558. However, the present court was not sitting as an appellate court from Pitchers J. The injunction was entitled to a presumption of regularity, and the defendants had to show a proper ground for discharge. The alleged absence of a letter before action and alleged failures to investigate personal circumstances did not justify discharge.
3. Suspension. The court applied the public-interest reasoning in Mid Bedfordshire District Council v Brown [2004] EWCA Civ 1709; [2005] JPL 1060. Suspending an injunction after deliberate breach could condone contempt, diminish respect for court orders and undermine the rule of law. The local authorities’ acceptance that further accommodation was needed did not create an exemption from planning controls. The defendants’ planning prospects were remote, and evidence of a sufficiently comprehensive search for alternative accommodation was lacking.
4. Authorities relied upon by the defendants. Simmons v First Secretary of State [2005] EWHC 287 turned on its facts and concerned an enforcement appeal rather than enforcement of an existing injunction. Guildford BC v Smith [1994] JPL 734, arising from Guildford BC v Valier (20 April 1993, unreported), was exceptional because of exhaustive relocation efforts. It did not establish a general defence to enforcement.
5. Family circumstances could justify a short period for departure, including the expected confinement of one defendant, but did not justify a lengthy suspension. Following the approach in South Bucks Council v Porter (No 2) [2004] 1 WLR 1953 and Coates v South Bucks DC [2004] EWCA Civ 1378, the court allowed two months to leave and a further month to restore the land.
6. Each defendant was committed to prison for 12 months, suspended on terms requiring departure by 23 November 2005 and restoration of the land by 23 December 2005.