Akbars Restaurant (Middlesborough) Limited v Secretary of State for the Home Department

A civil penalty notice under section 15(6)(a) of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 must, when read as a whole, identify the specific limb of section 15(1) relied upon. Listing mutually exclusive grounds is insufficient. The penal character of the power and procedural fairness require accurate reasons that permit an informed objection or appeal. A statutory rehearing permits new evidence about the decision actually made, but does not permit the authority to change its basic case or rely on an unspecified ground. The effect of a procedural breach depends on statutory purpose. Where specifying the ground is a condition of a valid notice, later disclosure cannot cure non-compliance and the notice is invalid.

The Secretary of State imposed a £15,000 civil penalty on a restaurant company for employing a worker without permission to work in the United Kingdom. The penalty notice reproduced all the mutually exclusive grounds in section 15(1) of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, but did not identify which ground applied. During the ensuing proceedings, the Secretary of State gave inconsistent accounts of the particular limb relied upon.

HHJ Gargan dismissed the employer’s county court appeal. The Court of Appeal also dismissed its appeal in [2024] EWCA Civ 1387; [2025] 1 WLR 1306. It held that the notice stated why the employer was liable and that the rehearing procedure permitted reliance upon a different limb. The central issues before the Supreme Court were whether section 15(6)(a) required the notice to specify the applicable limb of section 15(1), whether later reliance upon another limb was permissible, and whether non-compliance invalidated the notice.

1. Appeal allowed unanimously. Lord Sales delivered the judgment, with which Lord Richards, Lord Leggatt, Lady Rose and Lady Simler agreed. The civil penalty notice failed to comply with section 15(6)(a) of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 and was invalid.
2. A penalty notice must be read as a whole when assessing statutory compliance. Statutory purpose, however, must be identified through the enacted words in their immediate and wider context. A general policy of discouraging illegal working could not gloss or displace Parliament’s particular requirement. Legislation commonly balances its principal objective with fairness, legal certainty and other values.
3. The regime involved the state’s penal power. The rule of law and procedural fairness required accurate and sufficient reasons, both to discipline the exercise of that power and to allow the employer to decide whether to object or appeal. The three limbs of section 15(1) were mutually exclusive. Before exercising the power in section 15(2), the Secretary of State necessarily had to decide which limb applied. Section 15(6)(a), in requiring the notice to state why liability was thought to arise, therefore required disclosure of that limb.
4. Sections 16 and 17 reinforced that construction. An employer could not effectively deny liability, seek cancellation or prepare an appeal without knowing the case to answer. A rehearing under section 17(3) concerned the decision actually made. Section 17(3)(b) allowed new evidence bearing on matters already decided, but did not permit the Secretary of State to change the basic nature of the case or rely upon an unspecified limb.
5. R v Soneji [2006] 1 AC 340 established a purposive framework for determining the effect of non-compliance with a statutory procedural requirement; it did not impose a universal substantial-compliance test. Here, the statutory language, penal context, fairness requirements and operation of the scheme showed that specification of the applicable limb was a condition of validity. Later disclosure could not cure the defect. The Secretary of State could instead issue a fresh, compliant notice.
6. JN (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 307; [2009] Imm AR 615 was distinguishable. There, the defective notice was not the operative deportation decision and the omission had not impaired the appeal. Here, the penalty notice was itself the operative penal act and failure to specify the ground undermined the statutory purpose.

1. United Kingdom Supreme Court: Allowed the employer’s appeal unanimously and held the civil penalty notice invalid.
2. Court of Appeal: In [2024] EWCA Civ 1387 ; [2025] 1 WLR 1306 , dismissed the employer’s appeal and upheld the conclusion that the notice complied with section 15(6)(a).
3. County Court: HHJ Gargan dismissed the employer’s appeal, holding that the notice was valid and that the Secretary of State could rely upon the expired-leave ground.