LJP v Disclosure and Barring Service

An appeal against a DBS barred-list decision under the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 is confined to an alleged mistake of law or in a finding of fact on which the decision was based. Whether inclusion is appropriate is not a question of law or fact. The Upper Tribunal reviews the alleged mistake; it does not conduct its own risk assessment. On the evidence here, the Tribunal found that the appellant knew of the care booking and, by not stopping it or telling the agency she could not attend, effectively accepted it and allowed another person to attend in her place. DBS had therefore made no material mistake in its factual findings.

The appellant was a carer engaged through an agency to provide live-in care. After another person attended a placement pretending to be her, DBS included the appellant in the adults’ barred list. The appellant said she had been ill with Covid and had entrusted her phone to friends, who arranged the booking without her knowledge or consent. She appealed, and permission was limited to whether DBS had made a mistake in its factual findings. The appellant and her husband gave evidence at the Upper Tribunal hearing. The central issue was whether the appellant knew of the booking and allowed the imposter to attend in her place.

The appeal was dismissed. The decision to include the appellant in the adults’ barred list was confirmed.

1. Under sections 4(2) and 4(3) of the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, the appeal was confined to an alleged mistake of law or fact. The appropriateness of inclusion was not itself a question of law or fact. The Tribunal’s task was to decide whether DBS had made a material mistake in its factual findings, not to carry out a risk assessment.

2. It was common ground that a booking had been made in the appellant’s name, that she had not attended, and that an imposter had provided care while pretending to be her. The dispute was whether the appellant knew about the booking and allowed the imposter to attend in her place.

3. The Tribunal considered the appellant’s account that illness led her to give friends control of her phone for an extended period. There was little corroborating evidence. The appellant’s husband gave some support to her account, but his evidence was limited. The Tribunal also found that the appellant herself had spoken with the agency on 12 October 2020. The related email referred to a conversation after the agency knew of the impersonation, which materially contradicted her claim that she had no knowledge of it until DBS contacted her. This damaged her credibility, but did not by itself prove the rest of her account false.

4. Even accepting that the appellant had been ill and relied on friends for help, the Tribunal found it more likely that she gave them access to her phone only for limited purposes and periods. On the balance of probabilities, she knew of the booking before it went ahead and did not stop it or tell the agency that she could not attend. DBS had therefore made no material mistake in finding that she effectively accepted the booking and allowed the imposter to attend. The family member’s account of the imposter’s departure did not alter that conclusion, and the risk-assessment material cited by the appellant did not address the Tribunal’s task.

As the only permitted ground of appeal failed, DBS’s decision was confirmed.

• Disclosure and Barring Service: On 2 June 2021, and sent to the appellant on 7 March 2024, DBS decided to include her in the adults’ barred list.
• Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber): Permission to appeal was granted on 30 October 2025, limited to alleged mistakes in DBS’s factual findings. Following a hearing on 19 March 2026, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal and confirmed DBS’s decision: [2026] UKUT 215 (AAC) .