Pia Spragg v Malcolm Thompson Pearson

A registered-land transfer made pursuant to a Tomlin order cannot be treated as merely implementing that order where it contains terms beyond the settlement and the application challenges those additional terms. In deciding whether to strike out an application under s 108(2), the FTT must assess the actual terms and relief sought, and consider whether its jurisdiction may extend, if necessary, to a contract embodied in the Tomlin order to make a qualifying disposition. A person’s absence does not itself justify strike-out where the evidence shows that person substantively challenges the transfer and joinder as a co-applicant or respondent is available.

Pia Spragg applied to the First-tier Tribunal under s 108(2) of the Land Registration Act 2002 to cancel or set aside a 2020 transfer made to Malcolm Thompson Pearson. The transfer was executed by Spragg and her co-transferor, Redeeris Hendric Dirk Oudijk, following a Tomlin order between them and Pearson. The order required Spragg and Oudijk to clean and maintain a ditch; the transfer also imposed further ditch-related covenants and included an application for a restriction.

The FTT struck out Spragg’s application, reasoning that the transfer reflected the Tomlin order and that it could not go behind that order. It later considered Oudijk’s absence fatal. Spragg appealed. The central issue was whether the FTT was entitled to strike out the application on those grounds.

1. Appeal allowed. The FTT’s order striking out the application was set aside.
2. The FTT proceeded on the false premise that the transfer merely gave effect to the Tomlin order. The order and its schedule required Spragg and Oudijk to clean and maintain the ditch. They did not provide for the restriction or for the transfer covenant barring a disposal unless the disponee first executed a deed of covenant. Spragg challenged the transfer to the extent that it went beyond the agreement; she did not ask the FTT to set aside or vary the Tomlin order. The FTT therefore could not dispose of the application on the basis that it could not go behind that order.
3. Section 108(2) of the Land Registration Act 2002 empowers the FTT to make orders the High Court could make to rectify or set aside documents affecting qualifying dispositions, including contracts to make such dispositions. The FTT also erred by failing to consider whether that jurisdiction might extend, if necessary, to a contract embodied in the Tomlin order as a contract to make a qualifying disposition. The Upper Tribunal left that jurisdictional question open.
4. Oudijk’s absence did not justify strike-out. His witness statement indicated that he substantively challenged the transfer. He could have been joined as a co-applicant with his consent or as a respondent.

1. Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber): In [2026] UKUT 231 (LC) , allowed the appeal and set aside the FTT’s order.
2. First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber): By an order dated 26 January 2026, struck out Spragg’s application under s 108(2) of the Land Registration Act 2002.