Najat Hamasala v The Commissioners for HMRC

When considering a late appeal, the tribunal must conduct a balancing exercise that gives particular importance to efficient, proportionate litigation and respect for statutory time limits. The approach in Martland v HMRC, as amplified by Katib and endorsed in HMRC v Medpro Healthcare Ltd, is to be followed. The decision is evaluative, so an appellate tribunal should be reluctant to substitute its assessment. A disagreement about the weight given to particular factors does not, without more, show an arguable error of law. Permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal requires a realistic prospect of a material error of law.

Najat Hamasala sought permission to appeal the First-tier Tribunal’s refusal to allow late appeals against an HMRC closure notice, discovery assessments and late-filing penalties. The FTT decision, released on 23 October 2025 under reference TC/2024/04190, found the appeals substantially out of time. The FTT later refused permission to appeal. After an initial refusal on the papers, Mr Hamasala sought reconsideration at a hearing. He relied on alleged errors in HMRC’s calculations, his accountant’s failures and medical circumstances, his correspondence with HMRC, his financial position and his limited English. The issue was whether there was an arguable material error of law in the FTT’s refusal to permit the late appeals.

Permission to appeal was refused.

1. Threshold and governing approach. Under section 11(1) of the Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, an appeal to the Upper Tribunal lies only on a point of law. Permission requires a realistic, rather than fanciful, prospect that the FTT made a material error of law. For late appeals, the applicable balancing approach is the guidance in Martland v HMRC as amplified by Katib. The Court of Appeal’s conclusion in HMRC v Medpro Healthcare Ltd that this guidance is appropriate was final and is the approach to follow. The balancing exercise gives particular importance to efficient litigation, proportionate cost and respect for statutory time limits.
2. The FTT’s approach. The FTT had referred to Martland v HMRC where, in context, it should have referred to Medpro Healthcare Ltd v HMRC. The Upper Tribunal treated this as a clerical error. In any event, the FTT said it would have reached the same result if it had given greater significance to time limits and related considerations.
3. The grounds advanced. The FTT could consider obvious strengths or weaknesses in the proposed substantive case as bearing on potential prejudice to the taxpayer. Mr Hamasala’s case was not obviously strong enough to require express discussion. The FTT addressed the accountant’s failures under the general rule in Katib that an adviser’s failures should generally be treated as the litigant’s failures. It had also taken account of Mr Hamasala’s evidence about HMRC correspondence, his knowledge of the tribunal, his language and the financial consequences of losing. Serious financial consequences do not necessarily outweigh the other factors.
4. Appellate review. Whether to permit a late appeal is an evaluative decision for the FTT, which heard from Mr Hamasala and considered the relevant documents. The Upper Tribunal should be reluctant to substitute its own assessment. Mr Hamasala’s contention that more weight should have been given to certain factors did not make an error of law arguable. Permission to appeal was refused. The judge also noted that an unsuccessful Upper Tribunal appeal could expose a party to the other side’s legal costs.

1. Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber): Reconsidered the paper refusal at a hearing and refused permission to appeal on 2 July 2026. [2026] UKUT 246 (TCC) .
2. First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber): Refused permission for the late appeals on 23 October 2025 and refused permission to appeal on 30 January 2026. FTT reference TC/2024/04190.