SU v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Expert reports – format)

Expert reports can assist in protection appeals when they are independent, transparent about their sources, use primary material where possible, address the appellant’s facts and respond to concerns raised about them. Reports that copy second-hand media material, obscure quotations or rely on unsupported or outdated sources may receive little weight. Where an expert abroad cannot attend for cross-examination, a written process may be used. If concerns are put to the expert in good time, fairness may not require a formal request for further information in every case.

The appellant, a Bangladeshi national and supporter of Jamaat-e-Islami and its student wing, appealed the refusal of his protection and human-rights claims. The First-tier Tribunal dismissed the appeal, while accepting that he had previously been detained and tortured, had an outstanding arrest warrant and remained politically active. The Upper Tribunal set that decision aside for material error of law, preserved findings of fact and retained remaking.

At the remaking hearing, the outstanding issues were whether the appellant faced a current risk on return after political change in Bangladesh, whether sufficient state protection was available and whether he could relocate internally. He relied on an expert report about the country situation and his pending case. His Article 8 claim stood or fell with the protection claim, and he did not pursue an Article 3 claim based on prison conditions.

1. Appeal dismissed. The appellant failed to establish, even to the lower standard applicable to protection claims, a genuine and well-founded fear of persecution on return. The human-rights appeal was also dismissed. There was no order as to costs.

2. The Tribunal gave very little weight to the expert reports. They contained unsupported assertions, copied news material without clearly identifying it as quotation, relied on sources that were not always primary or did not support the claims made, and failed to address material contrary evidence, including the CPIN and preserved findings. The reports also left important questions about the appellant’s circumstances and available case-review process unanswered.

   Expert reports evaluating digital open-source information are more likely to assist where they are independent; identify their sources and use primary material where possible; apply general conclusions to the appellant’s facts, including preserved findings; and address concerns raised by a party consistently with the expert’s duty to the Tribunal. Reports relying on second- or third-hand media accounts, sources without links or unattributed quotations may carry less weight. These points apply to CPINs as well as independent reports.

3. Where an expert outside the United Kingdom cannot attend for cross-examination, a written process may be followed. If the challenging party communicates general concerns in advance and gives the expert sufficient time to respond, fairness may not require a separate formal request for further information. In this case, the written process did not cure the material gaps in the evidence.

4. The Tribunal considered the appellant’s previous persecution and outstanding arrest warrant under paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules. It found that the substantial political and institutional changes in Bangladesh, the ongoing review of politically motivated cases, and the appellant’s failure to use the available referral process meant that the preserved history did not establish a current risk. The expert’s contrary conclusions were inadequately supported. The appellant had not shown why his case could not be referred for review or why he could not obtain bail in the meantime.

5. Although it was not necessary to decide the remaining issues, the Tribunal found that state protection would be available to the relevant Horvarth standard. It also found that internal relocation was available and that there was no evidence it would be unduly harsh. The Tribunal considered sections 117A and 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002; its findings did not alter the conclusion that refusal was consistent with Article 8.

6. The Respondent’s failure to identify the email containing the new evidence was an oversight in a tight timetable following an extension of time. It did not amount to negligence or unreasonable conduct in the Ridehalgh sense. No order as to costs was made.

1. Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber): In the earlier error-of-law decision, set aside the First-tier Tribunal’s decision for material error, preserved findings of fact and retained remaking. On remaking, the Tribunal dismissed the protection and human-rights appeals: [2026] UKUT 317 (IAC) .
2. First-tier Tribunal: Dismissed the appellant’s protection and human-rights appeals. The decision was set aside for material error of law.