Shane Matin v The Commissioners for HMRC

On reconsideration of a paper refusal of permission to appeal, the Upper Tribunal asks whether the renewed grounds disclose an arguable material error in the refusal’s reasoning or another compelling reason. Reconsideration is not a reargument of the original application. A challenge to factual findings must identify a legal error; disagreement with the weight given to evidence is insufficient. A tribunal must explain the issues it decided, but need not address every submission or document. Procedural fairness and equality of arms require decisions that reflect the parties’ actual positions and circumstances, not identical treatment regardless of context.

Shane Matin sought to bar HMRC from further participation in FTT proceedings concerning Personal Liability Notices issued to him in connection with corporation tax and construction industry scheme liabilities of APQ Developments Ltd, of which he was the sole company officer. The FTT dismissed the barring application and refused permission to appeal. The Upper Tribunal refused Matin’s renewed permission application on the papers. He then sought reconsideration under Rule 22(4) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. His grounds challenged the findings on HMRC’s alleged procedural default, the decision to determine the barring application on the papers, procedural fairness, the FTT’s reasons and its treatment of documentary evidence. The question was whether the renewed grounds disclosed an arguable material error in the Upper Tribunal’s paper refusal or another compelling reason to grant permission.

1. Reconsideration refused. The renewed grounds disclosed neither a realistic prospect of establishing that the FTT erred in law nor another compelling reason to grant permission. The question was whether the grounds identified an arguable material error in the reasoning of the earlier paper refusal, not whether Matin could reargue the original application.

2. Alleged procedural default. The FTT had found that HMRC had not received the barring application, had requested a copy and had not defaulted by seeking time to respond. That finding was open to it on the evidence, and the renewed grounds identified no arguable legal error. The principle from BPP Holdings Ltd v HMRC [2017] UKSC 55 that HMRC has no privileged procedural status was uncontroversial, but neither tribunal had treated HMRC as exempt from directions. Denton v TH White Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 906 and Martland v HMRC [2018] UKUT 178 (TCC), concerning consequences of default and relief from sanctions, assisted Matin only if default had occurred.

3. Different procedural decisions. The decision whether a hearing remained necessary and the later determination of the barring application addressed different questions. Material relevant to case management need not be determinative, or materially significant, to the merits. Its consideration at the procedural stage did not require a separate explanation linking the two decisions. Applying the fair-minded and informed observer principle in Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67, the chronology and different decisions disclosed no arguable basis for finding a real possibility of bias or procedural unfairness.

4. Fairness and equality of arms. Rule 2 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 requires procedural fairness, not identical treatment regardless of circumstances. Equality of arms concerns each party’s reasonable opportunity to present its case without substantial procedural disadvantage. Because the FTT found no HMRC default, the comparison underlying Matin’s fairness arguments was materially weakened.

5. Reasons and evidence. Flannery v Halifax Estate Agencies Ltd [1999] EWCA Civ 811 and English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 605 require reasons that identify the issues and explain their resolution when read fairly as a whole; they do not require discussion of every document or submission. The FTT adequately explained why each limb of the barring application failed. Under Edwards v Bairstow [1956] AC 14, appellate intervention is confined to legal error, including findings unsupported by or contrary to evidence, based on a misunderstanding, or unreachable by a reasonable tribunal properly directing itself. The grounds alleged disagreement with the significance of the evidence, not such an error. The renewed application for permission to appeal was refused.

• Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) — on reconsideration, refused the renewed application for permission to appeal: [2026] UKUT 343 (TCC) .
• Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) — refused the renewed permission application on the papers on 16 June 2026; that refusal was the subject of this reconsideration.
• First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber) — dismissed Matin’s application to bar HMRC from further participation on 4 March 2026 and refused permission to appeal on 9 April 2026. No citation for those decisions is stated in the judgment.