Ismail Hamed v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions

A tribunal must investigate relevant evidential gaps where its inquisitorial jurisdiction requires it, assess the claimant’s evidence critically, and explain what it accepts or rejects. It must make clear findings about functional ability sufficient to support its scoring against the applicable descriptors. An error in fact-finding or reasons is material where the outcome could have been different had the error not occurred. Where further findings are needed, the Upper Tribunal may remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal.

The claimant sought Personal Independence Payment after reporting physical and mental health difficulties. The Secretary of State refused the claim, and the First-tier Tribunal confirmed that decision on 25 July 2025. The claimant appealed, arguing that the Tribunal had not adequately investigated why he had stopped working for part of the relevant period, assessed his evidence, or explained its findings. He also challenged the standard of proof. Permission to appeal was refused by the First-tier Tribunal but granted without restriction by the Upper Tribunal. The central issue was whether the Tribunal’s findings and reasons were legally sufficient to support its decision.

1. Appeal allowed. The Upper Tribunal found, on the balance of probabilities, that the First-tier Tribunal had made material errors of law. The relevant inquiry was whether the Tribunal had adequately investigated and explained matters likely to be relevant to the appeal, not whether it had to accept the claimant’s account.

2. The claimant had stopped work in early June 2023 and did not return until late September. The Tribunal did not adequately investigate the circumstances and reasons for that absence, although they were likely to be relevant. A tribunal must assess evidence critically, identify what it accepts and rejects, explain how it resolves material conflicts, and make clear findings about what the claimant could and could not do. The Tribunal’s partial account of the claimant’s reported difficulties did not explain its assessment of their reliability or provide findings sufficient to support its scoring against the Schedule 1 descriptors. (see [16]–[18])

3. The errors were material because, without them, the outcome could have been different. The Upper Tribunal therefore exercised its discretion under section 12(2)(a) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 to set the decision aside. (see [18]–[19])

4. Further findings of fact were required, and the First-tier Tribunal was the appropriate forum because of its expert members. The appeal was remitted under section 12(2)(b)(i) of the 2007 Act for an oral rehearing before a differently constituted panel. The rehearing must address the issues raised by the appeal and may consider other issues within the Tribunal’s discretion under section 12(8)(a) of the Social Security Act 1998. It must assess circumstances as they stood at the date of the Secretary of State’s decision. Later evidence is admissible if it relates to that time: R(DLA) 2 & 3/01. The new panel is not bound by the former Tribunal’s decision. Any other alleged errors were subsumed by the rehearing. (see [20]–[21]; Directions 1–5)

• Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber): Allowed the appeal, set aside the First-tier Tribunal’s decision and remitted the appeal for rehearing: [2026] UKUT 353 (AAC) .
• First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber): On 25 July 2025, confirmed the Secretary of State’s refusal of Personal Independence Payment. Tribunal Judge Lazenby refused permission to appeal on 5 January 2026.