Yitty Friedman v The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions & Anor

For the universal credit condition requiring acceptance of the most up-to-date claimant commitment, a later-generated version is not more up to date solely because it was generated later. If it is not materially different from the commitment already accepted, and that version still accurately records the claimant’s ongoing responsibilities, it remains the most up-to-date version under section 14(5) of the Welfare Reform Act 2012. A claimant’s failure to accept an identical replacement therefore does not breach the basic condition in section 4(1)(e).

Yitty Friedman and her husband, Moshe Friedman, were joint claimants for universal credit. The Secretary of State ended their award on the ground that Yitty had not accepted an updated claimant commitment. The First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) dismissed her appeal on 25 March 2025. It found that an updated commitment had been required and that failure to accept it ended entitlement, despite the claimants’ holiday and lack of a text or email reminder.

On appeal, the Secretary of State supported the appeal on the grounds that the Tribunal had misunderstood the contents of the two commitments. The parties agreed that the previously accepted commitment and the later one were materially identical. The principal question was whether the claimant had failed the acceptance condition by not accepting a later-generated commitment that did not alter her ongoing responsibilities.

The appeal was allowed. The First-tier Tribunal’s decision was set aside for error of law and remade. The claimant’s universal credit entitlement did not cease on the ground that she had failed to accept an up-to-date claimant commitment.

1. The Tribunal’s finding that the commitments differed was perverse on the evidence before it. The only evidence of the previously accepted commitment showed that it imposed no work-search, work-availability or related requirements. The later commitment imposed none either. The Secretary of State accepted that the two were materially identical. The evidence indicated that the claimant was in the light-touch regime because her earnings exceeded the administrative earnings threshold in regulation 99(6) of the Universal Credit Regulations 2013.
2. Under section 14(5) of the Welfare Reform Act 2012, a commitment can be more up to date only if it has in fact been updated. Where a newly offered commitment is not materially different from the one already accepted, and the accepted version still accurately records the claimant’s ongoing responsibilities, the earlier version remains the most up-to-date version. Failure to accept the identical later version therefore does not breach the basic condition in section 4(1)(e). The Tribunal’s contrary finding was a material error of law.
3. The Tribunal did not decide the claimant’s other grounds. The question whether she had been instructed to accept a commitment, given a deadline, and provided sufficient notice was not raised below and had no supporting findings. It was unnecessary to resolve it once the appeal succeeded on other grounds. The decision also left open the effective-date issue that had become academic.
4. As a tentative view only, if the new commitment had been created on 26 August 2024, the claimant could not have failed to accept it during an assessment period beginning on 26 July. Any change could take effect only from 26 August. The point was academic to the appeal and was not determined.
5. The Judge observed, following Hillingdon LBC v (1) AP (2) SP [2026] EWCA Civ 216, that courts should not spend resources deciding issues that no longer arise. He also said that any issue requiring determination in other cases should be addressed at first instance on full and proper argument.
6. The Judge would have treated the grant of permission as extending to all five grounds if it had been necessary to decide the point, applying Safi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] UKUT 338 (IAC). He also agreed with the caution in FO v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (UC) [2022] UKUT 56 (AAC) that tribunals may need to scrutinise the Secretary of State’s submissions where the documentary material is sparse.

1. Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber): On appeal, found an error of law, allowed the appeal, set aside the First-tier Tribunal’s decision and remade it. The claimant’s entitlement had not ceased on the stated ground: [2026] UKUT 362 (AAC) .
2. First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber): Dismissed the appeal against the decision ending the joint universal credit award on 25 March 2025.