FA v The Disclosure and Barring Service

[2026] UKUT 388 (AAC)

Summary

On an appeal against inclusion in a barred list, the Upper Tribunal may consider relevant oral evidence together with the written evidence and make its own findings of primary fact. The appellant must persuade the tribunal that the Disclosure and Barring Service made a material mistake of fact or law.

Witnesses’ withdrawal of statements or failure to attend a criminal trial does not, by itself, establish that their original accounts were false. Their reasons and the other evidence may be relevant to the weight given to those accounts.

The proportionality of barring requires consideration of the importance of the protective objective, its connection to the measure, the availability of a less intrusive measure and the balance between the measure’s effects and its protective benefit.

Factual background

FA was a care worker with access to funds belonging to vulnerable adult service users. The Disclosure and Barring Service included him in the adults’ barred list after finding that he had dishonestly withdrawn £238.08 and falsified colleagues’ signatures on financial records. FA denied dishonesty and said that he had used the money to buy goods for service users.

Colleagues who had denied signing the records withdrew their police statements and did not attend the criminal trial, at which FA was acquitted for lack of evidence. FA appealed to the Upper Tribunal against the barring decision. He challenged the findings about the signatures and the closure of a shop where he said he had made purchases. He also challenged the assessment of the witnesses’ evidence, proportionality and the burden of proof.

Held

The appeal was refused. The Disclosure and Barring Service had made no material mistake of fact or law.

  1. On an appeal under section 4 of the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, the Upper Tribunal could consider relevant oral and written evidence together and make findings of primary fact. FA had to persuade the tribunal that the service had made a mistake of fact. The tribunal considered his oral account alongside the other evidence, including the withdrawn witness statements and independent evidence that the shop had closed before three of the transactions (DBS v RI [2024] EWCA Civ 95) ([10]–[11], [45]–[50]).
  2. The absence of handwriting evidence did not significantly undermine the colleagues’ statements that they had not signed the vouchers. Their withdrawal of the statements did not deny the facts originally stated. Considering the evidence cumulatively, the tribunal rejected the suggestion that someone other than FA had signed the vouchers in the colleagues’ names. FA was the person who received the money and needed the vouchers countersigned ([45]–[47]).
  3. The service had considered the witnesses’ failure to attend the criminal trial and its effect on credibility and weight. It was entitled to recognise that non-attendance did not itself establish dishonesty. The reasons for withdrawal included the passage of time and reluctance to attend or seek punishment; they did not state that the original accounts were incorrect ([53]–[57]).
  4. Applying the proportionality framework in Bank Mellat v Her Majesty’s Treasury (No 2) [2014] AC, as adopted in KS v Disclosure and Baring Service [2025] UKUT 45 (AAC), the tribunal held that protection of vulnerable adults from financial harm was sufficiently important and rationally connected to barring. No less intrusive measure was open to the service. Despite the severe effect on FA and his previous good record, the repeated conduct created a transferable risk to vulnerable adults and justified the measure ([59]–[61]).
  5. The service’s reliance on FA’s inability to explain why colleagues made their statements did not establish an unlawful reversal of the burden in this case. That consideration was part of substantial cumulative evidence, including the colleagues’ accounts, the shop closure, missing receipts and departures from financial policies ([62]–[64]).

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Appellate history

  • Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber): The appeal was refused because the Disclosure and Barring Service had made no material mistake of fact or law.
  • Disclosure and Barring Service: By a decision communicated on 26 February 2025, the service included FA in the adults’ barred list.

Cases on related points

  1. JG v Disclosure and Barring Service[2026] UKUT 131 (AAC) · Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber)Relies on 2 of the same authorities
  2. SLS v Disclosure and Barring Service[2025] UKUT 129 (AAC) · Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber)Relies on 2 of the same authorities
  3. NAC v Disclosure and Barring Service[2025] UKUT 304 (AAC) · Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber)Relies on 2 of the same authorities

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