Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 329

Civil proceedings for trespass to the person brought by offender

Part 13 Miscellaneous

(1)This section applies where—

(a) a person (“the claimant”) claims that another person (“the defendant”) did an act amounting to trespass to the claimant’s person, and

(b)the claimant has been convicted in the United Kingdom of an imprisonable offence committed on the same occasion as that on which the act is alleged to have been done.

(2)Civil proceedings relating to the claim may be brought only with the permission of the court.

(3)The court may give permission for the proceedings to be brought only if there is evidence that either—

(a)the condition in subsection (5) is not met, or

(b)in all the circumstances, the defendant’s act was grossly disproportionate.

(4)If the court gives permission and the proceedings are brought, it is a defence for the defendant to prove both—

(a)that the condition in subsection (5) is met, and

(b)that, in all the circumstances, his act was not grossly disproportionate.

(5)The condition referred to in subsection (3)(a) and (4)(a) is that the defendant did the act only because—

(a)he believed that the claimant—

(i)was about to commit an offence,

(ii)was in the course of committing an offence, or

(iii)had committed an offence immediately beforehand; and

(b)he believed that the act was necessary to—

(i)defend himself or another person,

(ii)protect or recover property,

(iii)prevent the commission or continuation of an offence, or

(iv)apprehend, or secure the conviction, of the claimant after he had committed an offence;

or was necessary to assist in achieving any of those things.

(6)Subsection (4) is without prejudice to any other defence.

[F734 (7)Where—

(a)a person is convicted of an offence under section 42 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (criminal conduct), and

(b)the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales (within the meaning given by that section) is an imprisonable offence,

he is to be treated for the purposes of this section as having been convicted in the United Kingdom of that corresponding offence; and in paragraph (a) the reference to conviction includes anything that under section 376(1) and (2) of that Act is to be treated as a conviction.F734]

(8)In this section—

(a)the reference to trespass to the person is a reference to—

(i)assault,

(ii)battery, or

(iii)false imprisonment;

(b)references to a defendant’s belief are to his honest belief, whether or not the belief was also reasonable;

(c) “court” means the High Court or [F735 the county court F735] and

(d) “imprisonable offence” means an offence which, in the case of a person aged 18 or over, is punishable by imprisonment.

Definitions used in section 329 1

the court

(2) In relation to such an application or reference, any reference to “the court” in section 269(2) to (5) and Schedule 21 is to be read as a reference to the High Court.

Defined in Sch.22 para.11(2) · see it in the full Act

Cases considering section 329 13

Buike v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire

[2009] EWCA Civ 971 · 15 July 2009Limits

The court interpreted the permission requirement as a real-prospect-of-success threshold analogous to reverse summary judgment. An application must not become a mini-trial, and the court has no residual discretion to refuse permission once that threshold is met (see paras [4]–[5]; [17]–[20]). The claimant must produce evidence giving a real prospect of establishing either that the subsection (5) condition is absent or that the defendant’s act was grossly disproportionate. The claimant satisfied the first route (see paras [4]; [17]–[19]). The court declined to express a hypothetical view on gross disproportionality because the officer’s claimed belief would have to be determined at trial. The statutory defence therefore remained undetermined (see para [19]). Absence of the specified honest belief may be established inferentially from what the defendant did and the surrounding circumstances. The footage and the officer’s explanation gave a real prospect of establishing that he did not believe the apparent kicks were necessary (see paras [15]–[19]). The court noted that trespass to the person includes assault and that the statutory references concern an honest belief, whether or not reasonable (see para [3]).

Adorian v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis

[2009] EWCA Civ 18 · 23 January 2009Interprets

The permission requirement is procedural and directory. Proceedings commenced without permission are not void, and the defect may be cured by a later application subject to costs consequences (see paras [40]–[42]). The words requiring court permission to bring proceedings do not create a jurisdictional precondition requiring permission before commencement. They impose a procedural requirement capable of later cure (see paras [20]–[22]; [40]–[42]). The permission threshold was satisfied because the severity and circumstances of the injury supported a rational inference that grossly disproportionate force had been used (see paras [11]–[13]). The subsection supplies a special statutory defence after permission is granted. The permission stage requires sufficient merits to defeat that defence if the action is to proceed (see paras [5]–[7]; [40]). The subsection protects acts based upon the defendant’s belief that intervention was necessary to prevent an offence or apprehend an offender. The court treated that protection as extending inexorably to police officers (see paras [6]–[7]). The relevant belief is honest belief, whether or not reasonable. Consequently, section 329 protects objectively unreasonable conduct unless it is in bad faith or involves grossly disproportionate force (see paras [6]–[7]; [39]).

Anthony Jones v Chief Constable of Essex Police

[2026] EWHC 129 (KB) · 2 February 2026Limits

The judgment identifies section 329 as imposing a permission requirement on civil claims alleging trespass to the person where the claimant was convicted of an imprisonable offence committed on the same occasion. The provision supplied the statutory framework for the application. (see paras [3], [6]-[8]) Section 329(1) was applied to establish that the claimant’s alleged trespass claim followed an imprisonable offence committed on the same occasion as the alleged police assault. This triggered the statutory permission requirement. (see paras [6], [8]) Section 329(2) was applied to require court permission before the claimant could bring civil proceedings. Permission was ultimately refused after reconsideration. (see paras [6], [11], [34]) Section 329(3) limits permission to cases where there is evidence that the statutory condition is not met or the defendant’s act was grossly disproportionate. The judgment proceeded on the gross-disproportionality limb. (see paras [6]-[8], [22], [34]) The parties agreed that the relevant statutory condition under section 329(3)(a) was engaged because the officers acted on the belief that the claimant was committing, had committed, or was about to commit an offence. (see paras [6]-[8]) Section 329(3)(b) required the claimant to provide evidence giving a real prospect of proving that the force was grossly disproportionate in all the circumstances. The claimant failed to meet that threshold. (see paras [8], [28]-[31], [34]) The judgment noted an erroneous reference to section 329(5) in the claimant’s submissions, treating it as a reference to the gross-disproportionality issue under section 329(3)(b). (see paras [6], [21])

What each judgment says about section 329 is in the case-law panel in the full Act.

Explanatory note

721.Section 329 makes new provision about cases where a person who has been convicted of an imprisonable criminal offence takes civil action for damages for trespass to the person against the victim of the offence or against a third party who has intervened, for example to protect the victim or to protect or recover property.

722.Subsection (1) set out the circumstances in which the section will apply. These are where the person bringing the civil action (the claimant) claims that the defendant did an act amounting to trespass to his or her person; and where the claimant has been convicted in the United Kingdom of an imprisonable offence committed on the same occasion as that on which the defendant's act is alleged to have been done.

723.Subsection (2) provides that in these circumstances proceedings may only be brought with the permission of the court.

724.Subsection (3) sets out the only circumstances in which the court may give permission for the proceedings to be brought. These are if there is evidence that the condition set out in subsection (5) is not met, or if there is evidence that in all the circumstances the defendant's act was grossly disproportionate.

725.Subsection (4) provides that if the court does give permission and the proceedings are brought, the defendant will not be liable if he can prove that the condition set out in subsection (5) is met, and that in all the circumstances his act was not grossly disproportionate.

726.Subsection (5) sets out the condition referred to in subsections (3) and (4). This is that the defendant only did the act amounting to trespass to the claimant's person because he believed that (a) the claimant was either about to commit an offence, in the course of committing an offence, or had committed an offence immediately beforehand; and (b) the act was necessary to defend himself or another person; protect or recover property; prevent the commission or continuation of an offence; apprehend or secure the conviction of the claimant after he had committed the offence; or that the act was necessary to assist in achieving any of those things.

727.Subsection (6) ensures that the defence available to the defendant under subsection (4) does not prejudice his ability to rely on any other defence.

728.Subsection (7) ensures that the provisions of the section apply where members of the armed forces are found guilty of equivalent offences under the terms of the services Acts.

729.Subsection (8) defines various terms used in the section. Paragraph (a) provides that "trespass to the person" comprises assault, battery, or false imprisonment; paragraph (b) provides that references to the defendant's belief are to his honest belief, whether or not it was also reasonable; paragraph (c) provides that "court" in proceedings under this Section means the High Court or a county court; and paragraph (d) defines "imprisonable offence" as an offence which in the case of a person aged 18 or over is punishable by imprisonment.

All the explanatory notes for the Act

Amendments and notes

3 notes from legislation.gov.uk

Amendments

  1. F734S. 329(7) substituted (28.3.2009 for certain purposes and otherwise 31.10.2009) by Armed Forces Act 2006 (c. 52), ss. 378(1), 383, Sch. 16 para. 232 (with savings (31.10.2009) in S.I. 2009/1059, arts. 1(3), 205, Sch. 1 para. 53(9)(10)); S.I. 2009/812, art. 3 (with transitional provisions in S.I. 2009/1059); S.I. 2009/1167, art. 4 this amendment is subject to savings and/or transitional provisions, see the commentary.
  2. F735Words in s. 329(8)(c) substituted (22.4.2014) by Crime and Courts Act 2013 (c. 22), s. 61(3), Sch. 9 para. 52; S.I. 2014/954, art. 2(c) (with art. 3) (with transitional provisions and savings in S.I. 2014/956, arts. 3-11)

Modifications

  1. C69S. 329(7) modified (31.10.2009) by The Armed Forces Act 2006 (Transitional Provisions etc) Order 2009 (S.I. 2009/1059), arts. 1(3), 205, Sch. 1 para. 53(11)