(1)Sections 8 to 10, Part III . . . , sections 43M, . . ., 45, 45A, 47 . . . , 47C, 50 to 57B and 61 to 63, Parts VII and VIII, sections 92 and 93 and , Part X (except sections 100 , 103A and 134A and the other provisions of that Part so far as relating to the right not to be unfairly dismissed in a case where the dismissal is unfair by virtue of section 100 or 103A ) . . . do not apply to employment under a contract of employment in police service or to persons engaged in such employment.
(2) In subsection (1) “police service” means—
(a)service as a member of a constabulary maintained by virtue of an enactment, or
(b)subject to section 126 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (prison staff not to be regarded as in police service), service in any other capacity by virtue of which a person has the powers or privileges of a constable.
Cases considering section 200 7
[2017] EWCA Civ 1092 · 28 July 2017
The police-service exclusion applied to parks constables as a matter of domestic construction. Article 8 did not require a Convention-compatible reading because the redundancies and their ordinary consequences fell outside its ambit. (see paras [21]; [43]-[58]; [78])
[2014] EWCA Civ 178 · 26 February 2014Interprets
The court construed section 200 as excluding the specified statutory employment protections where an employee is in police service. The provision applied to the appellant because the Parks Police Service satisfied section 200(2)(a). (see paras [62]-[67]; [70]; [73])
Having found that the appellant was in police service, the court applied subsection (1) to exclude his statutory right to make an unfair-dismissal claim. (see paras [70]; [73])
The court interpreted subsection (2) as defining police service through alternative limbs. It held that the first limb governed the case, making it unnecessary to decide the appeal under the second. (see paras [35]-[36]; [63]; [67])
The court held that a small but properly organised parks police body was a constabulary maintained by virtue of enactments authorising its creation and the attestation of its officers. The appellant therefore fell within this limb. (see paras [63]-[66]; [73]; [75])
The court held that this limb was unnecessary once section 200(2)(a) applied. It nevertheless considered, alternatively, that the officers had the powers and privileges of constables. (see para [67])
[2007] EWCA Civ 424 · 4 May 2007Limits
Limits the section 94(1) unfair-dismissal right for police-service employees under contracts of employment, while the court recognised the separate extension of specified whistleblowing protections to constables. (see paras [22]-[23])
1 more judgment, and what each says about section 200, are in the
case-law panel in the full Act.