79(1)On the application of the administrator of a company the court may provide for the appointment of an administrator of the company to cease to have effect from a specified time.
(2)The administrator of a company shall make an application under this paragraph if—
(a)he thinks the purpose of administration cannot be achieved in relation to the company,
(b)he thinks the company should not have entered administration, or
(c) the company's creditors decide that he must make an application under this paragraph.
(3)The administrator of a company shall make an application under this paragraph if—
(a)the administration is pursuant to an administration order, and
(b)the administrator thinks that the purpose of administration has been sufficiently achieved in relation to the company.
(4)On an application under this paragraph the court may—
(a)adjourn the hearing conditionally or unconditionally;
(b)dismiss the application;
(c)make an interim order;
(d)make any order it thinks appropriate (whether in addition to, in consequence of or instead of the order applied for).
Cases considering Schedule B1, paragraph 79 18
[2023] EWHC 829 (Ch) · 14 April 2023
The court treated paragraph 79 as the route by which a court-appointed administrator’s appointment may be brought to an end. The court declined to make a prospective conditional termination order in the circumstances, particularly because the eventual exit route remained uncertain (see paras [10]; [21]-[22]).
[2022] EWHC 2974 (Ch) · 29 November 2022Interprets
The court held that once the administration’s purpose had been sufficiently achieved, the administrators were required to apply for their appointment to cease. The word “thinks” engaged a good-faith and rationality standard, while sufficient achievement was assessed objectively. (see paras [27]-[34])
[2022] EWHC 3015 (Ch) · 18 November 2022
The court terminated the administrators’ appointment under paragraph 79(1), concluding that the administration should cease because the company had no remaining assets and no sufficiently developed CVA proposal (see paras [38], [47]).
The court considered the statutory circumstance that the purpose of administration could not be achieved, in concluding that continuation was unjustified (see paras [38], [47]).
The court set out the statutory circumstance that the company should not have entered administration, although the decision principally proceeded on the absence of a viable purpose for continuation (see paras [38], [47]).
The court set out the statutory circumstance arising where creditors require an application to terminate the administration; that circumstance was not the principal basis of the order (see para [38]).
The court identified the power to adjourn an application under paragraph 79, although it did not rely on that power in making the final orders (see para [38]).
The court identified the power to dismiss the application, but made orders terminating the administration and winding up the company instead (see para [38]).
The court identified the power to make an interim order, but made final orders on the application (see para [38]).
The court used paragraph 79(4)(d) to make a compulsory winding-up order on the suspended DHL petition after terminating the administration (see paras [39], [48], [52]).
The court exercised its broad power to make any appropriate order, including winding up the company on the suspended petition (see paras [39], [48]-[52]).
What each judgment says about Schedule B1, paragraph 79 is in the case-law panel in the full Act.