Andrews v Director of Public Prosecutions

For an unintentional killing caused by negligence to amount to manslaughter, civil negligence is insufficient. The prosecution must prove a very high degree of negligence. Recklessness ordinarily captures the required gravity, although liability may also arise where an accused appreciates a risk but adopts grossly negligent means to avoid it.

Dangerous driving and manslaughter remain distinct offences. Driving may be dangerous within road traffic legislation without being sufficiently negligent to constitute manslaughter if death results. A jury considering manslaughter by driving must therefore receive the general criminal negligence test and must not be directed that proof of statutory dangerous driving alone establishes manslaughter.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter at Leeds Assizes after a van driven by him struck and killed a pedestrian. He had overtaken another car at speed, crossed to the off side of a well-lit road and failed to stop after the collision. He received 15 months’ imprisonment and lifelong disqualification from holding a driving licence.

The Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed his appeal. He appealed to the House of Lords under the Attorney-General’s certificate, alleging that the trial judge had misdirected the jury by approaching manslaughter through the statutory offence of dangerous driving.

The central question was whether the summing-up, considered as a whole, required the jury to find the high degree of negligence necessary for manslaughter.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. Lord Atkin delivered the leading speech. Viscount Finlay, Lord Thankerton, Lord Wright and Lord Roche agreed.

2. Per Lord Atkin, manslaughter by negligent driving is an instance of the general law governing an unintentional killing caused by breach of a duty of care. Negligence sufficient for civil liability does not suffice. The prosecution must establish a very high degree of negligence. Although “reckless” ordinarily comes closest to describing that degree, it is not exhaustive. An accused may appreciate a risk and intend to avoid it, yet use means so highly negligent that criminal liability follows.

3. Lord Atkin applied the substance of Rex v Bateman 19 Cr App Rep 8 (1925). The jury must find conduct displaying such disregard for the life and safety of others that it amounts to a crime deserving punishment. He regarded references to mens rea, criminality or punishment as unhelpful if treated as precise definitions, but approved Bateman’s substantive requirement of a high degree of negligence.

4. Statutory dangerous driving and manslaughter require different degrees of negligence. Section 12 of the Road Traffic Act 1930 covers driving without due care or attention. Section 11 covers reckless or dangerous driving, including conduct grave enough to constitute manslaughter if death results. The converse does not follow: dangerous driving may cause death without attaining the very high degree of negligence required for manslaughter. Section 34 of the Road Traffic Act 1934, which permits conviction for dangerous driving on a manslaughter indictment, was consistent with that distinction.

5. A trial judge should first explain the general criminal negligence threshold. The judge should then explain that it is not necessarily identical to the threshold for dangerous driving and identify when the jury may acquit of manslaughter but convict of dangerous driving. A direction requiring only proof that death resulted from dangerous driving under section 11 would be erroneous.

6. The opening part of the summing-up incorrectly risked treating breach of section 11 as the unlawful act necessary for manslaughter. A lawful act made criminal by a statutory standard of care is distinct from an unlawful act for this purpose. Nevertheless, the summing-up repeatedly directed the jury to recklessness and the high degree of negligence alleged. Read as a whole, it ultimately left the correct question to the jury, and the evidence made the verdict inevitable.

1. House of Lords: The appeal in Andrews v Director of Public Prosecutions [1937] AC 576 was dismissed unanimously. The summing-up, read as a whole, sufficiently conveyed the criminal negligence standard.

2. Court of Criminal Appeal: The appellant’s appeal against conviction and sentence was dismissed. No citation is stated in the judgment.

3. Leeds Assizes: Du Parcq J tried the appellant in December 1936. The jury convicted him of manslaughter, and he was sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment and disqualified for life from holding a motor driving licence.