Read v J Lyons & Co Ltd

Strict liability under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher requires the escape of something likely to cause mischief from a place occupied or controlled by the defendant to a place outside that occupation or control. Loss of control or an explosion within the defendant’s premises is insufficient.

An occupier carrying on a dangerous but lawful activity does not thereby guarantee the safety of persons lawfully present. The occupier must exercise care commensurate with the danger, but liability for an on-premises personal injury ordinarily requires proof of negligence. The decision leaves open whether the rule permits recovery for personal injury following a qualifying escape.

The respondents operated and controlled a government ordnance factory as agents for the Ministry of Supply. The appellant, a Ministry employee required to inspect shell-filling work, was injured by an explosion while lawfully inside the factory. She neither alleged nor proved negligence.

Cassels J held the respondents strictly liable under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. The Court of Appeal, consisting of Scott, MacKinnon and du Parcq LJJ, unanimously reversed that decision and entered judgment for the respondents.

The central issue before the House was whether an occupier manufacturing high-explosive shells was liable without proof of negligence to a person injured by an explosion within the premises.

1. Disposition. The House of Lords unanimously dismissed the appeal with costs. The explosion and the appellant’s injuries occurred within the respondents’ factory. The respondents were therefore not strictly liable under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330.
2. Duty to persons on the premises. Viscount Simon, Lord Macmillan, Lord Porter, Lord Simonds and Lord Uthwatt agreed in substance that the dangerous nature of a lawful operation does not impose an absolute guarantee of safety towards a person lawfully present. The appellant occupied the position of an invitee. The respondents owed her a duty to take care, and the degree of care required rose with the danger presented by the operation. Liability nevertheless depended upon proof of negligence, which was neither alleged nor proved.
3. The requirement of escape. Viscount Simon defined escape as movement from a place over which the defendant has occupation or control to a place outside that occupation or control. Lord Macmillan, Lord Porter and Lord Simonds adopted the same essential limitation. Lord Uthwatt similarly treated the rule as governing the intrusion of something from one occupier’s land onto another’s. An explosion or loss of control occurring wholly within the defendant’s premises does not constitute escape. That common conclusion formed the narrow and decisive basis of the judgment.
4. Non-natural use. Viscount Simon treated non-natural use as the other condition of liability under the rule, but the House found it unnecessary to decide whether wartime manufacture of munitions at the Government’s request satisfied that condition. Lord Porter regarded dangerousness and non-natural use as sensitive to the time, place and practices of society. Viscount Simon and Lord Uthwatt considered Lord Moulton’s analysis in Richards v Lothian [1913] A.C. 263 important to any future determination.
5. Earlier explosives authority and unresolved issues. The House distinguished Rainham Chemical Works Ltd v Belvedere Fish Guano Co [1921] 2 A.C. 465. That case concerned escape and damage to adjoining property, while the application of the rule to the defendant company was substantially uncontested. It did not establish strict liability for an injury occurring within the premises. Viscount Simon, Lord Porter and Lord Simonds expressly left open whether personal injury following a qualifying escape is recoverable under the rule; Lord Macmillan expressed a narrower view.
6. Voluntary assumption of risk. The respondents abandoned the defence of volenti non fit injuria. Lord Simonds and Lord Uthwatt considered that the appellant’s compelled wartime employment could not amount to consent to exempt the respondents from any duty owed to her.

1. House of Lords: Unanimously dismissed the appellant’s appeal with costs and affirmed judgment for the respondents.
2. Court of Appeal: Scott, MacKinnon and du Parcq LJJ unanimously reversed Cassels J and entered judgment for the respondents. No citation is stated.
3. Trial: Cassels J held the respondents strictly liable under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher, notwithstanding the absence of negligence. No citation is stated.