Mumford v Boulton and Paul (Steel Constructions) Ltd

Whether a dismissal is for redundancy depends on the employee’s contractual obligation to work at the alternative location and on what the employer did, rather than on the employer’s subjective state of mind. Where the contract is limited geographically, refusal to work outside that area is not a breach. If no work remains within the contractual area, dismissal may therefore be for redundancy. The geographical scope of the contract may be determined from relevant employment documents and the parties’ established practice. A circular which is not itself contractual, and does not vary the contract, may nevertheless provide strong evidence of the relevant contractual term. The employer bears the burden of showing that it was entitled to require work at the alternative location.

Mumford v Boulton and Paul (Steel Constructions) Ltd concerned an employee engaged as a steel erector on terms said to be either “nation-wide” or “London-based”. When no work was available in the London area, he refused an assignment at Daventry, 77 miles away, and was dismissed.

An employment tribunal focused on the employers’ state of mind in treating the refusal as a contractual breach. The matter reached the High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, and then the Court of Appeal. The central issue was whether the employee’s contract required him to work outside the London area and, consequently, whether the dismissal was for breach or redundancy.

1. Disposition. The appeal was dismissed unanimously, with costs.
2. Nature of the dismissal. Lord Denning M.R. held that the tribunal had adopted the wrong approach by asking what the employers believed they were doing. The question was what they had actually done. The employee’s contractual status had to be determined first. If he was a “nation-wide” employee, refusal to go to Daventry would be a breach of contract. If he was “London-based”, he was not bound to go there, and dismissal because no work was available in London was dismissal for redundancy.
3. Contractual geographical scope. Edmund Davies L.J. agreed that the circular, the general practice, and the history of the employee’s engagement and employment supported the conclusion that he was London-based. The dismissal letter made clear that the employers had no work available for him in London if he would not go to Daventry.
4. Evidence and burden. Megaw L.J. stated that the circular was not itself a contract and did not vary the pre-existing contract. It was nevertheless relevant evidence when determining the geographical term of the employment, particularly where no other contractual document defined that area. The employers bore the burden of showing that they were entitled to send the employee to Daventry and dismiss him for refusing; that burden had not been discharged.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): dismissed the appeal with costs in [1970] EWCA Civ 1.
2. High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division: the judgment records that the Divisional Court concluded that the employee was London-based and could not be required against his will to work at Daventry. No citation for the lower decision is stated.
3. Employment tribunal: treated the issue as turning on the employers’ state of mind rather than first determining the contractual geographical scope.